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A Reformed Antitrust Approach to
Distributor Terminations
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr. *
I. THE CLASH BETWEEN MANUFACTURER AND DEALER INTEP.STS:
IS A JUDICIAL SOLUTION POSSIBLE?
The federal courts' approach to distributor terminations has
generated more uncertainty and controversy than any other area
of antitrust law. In recent cases the courts have been unable to
effectively balance the interests of manufacturers and distributors.
In 1984, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Seruice Corp.,' and again in
1988, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,2 the Su-
preme Court severely limited the ability of terminated distributors
to prevail in antitrust cases. Indeed, under the interpretation of
Monsanto and Sharp adopted by many lower federal courts, it has
been nearly impossible for terminated distributors to reach a jury
with an antitrust claim.' In response, the retail industry, led by
the large discount chains, mounted a campaign in Congress to
overturn the decisions. In the 102d Congress, the House and Sen-
ate have each passed their own version of Bills (called the "Price
Fixing Prevention Act") that would overrule Monsanto and Sharp
and make it easier for terminated distributors to survive summary
judgment motions in antitrust cases.4 With Congress tugging in
• Vice President - Law, Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio; BA., Alleghe-
ny College, 1971; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974. The opinions expressed in this Article
are personal to the author and do not reflect the opinions of Parker-Hannifin Corpo-
ration.
1 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
2 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
3 See infra notes 84-88, 112-15 and accompanying text.
4 The Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991, H.R. 1470, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991),
passed the House of Representatives on October 10, 1991. The Senate approved the
Consumer Protection Against Price Fixing Act of 1991, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), on
May 9, 1991. Se 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1548, at 29 (January 16,
1992). A Conference Committee approved a compromise version of these Bills on June
18, 1992. See 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1571, at 841 (June 25, 1992).
Similar bills were introduced in earlier sessions of Congress. A predecessor bill was passed
by the House in November, 1987, in the 100th Congress, and again in the 101st Con-
gress, in April, 1990. A similar bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in
February, 1990. See Richard M. Steuer, The Turning Points in Distribution Law, 35 ANTI-
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
one direction and the federal courts in another, antitrust practi-
tioners and business executives have become confused over the
dividing line between permissible and illegal distributor termina-
tions.
Much of the confusion in the approach of Congress and the
federal courts can be traced to their inability to understand the
economic consequences of distributor terminations. The economic
characteristics of such terminations are, in fact, confusing because
they involve both "horizontal" and "vertical" elements. The courts
have traditionally viewed agreements among direct competitors as
"horizontal" and those between firms at different competitive levels
(for example, a supplier and its customers) as "vertical."5 Vertical
agreements have been treated moie leniently because they can be
intended for purposes other than to restrict competition.' How-
ever, in a distributor termination, it is often difficult to
characterize the parties' conduct as horizontal or vertical. Dis-
counters frequently claim that their termination was not effected
independently by the supplier but was induced by pressure applied
by full priced distributors. Such pressure typically is evidenced by
complaints made to the supplier about the terminated distributor's
price-cutting. The potential involvement of firms at the same com-
petitive level as the terminated distributor complicates the antitrust
analysis. In these "mixed termination" cases the outward form of
the alleged conspiracy between the supplier and complaining dis-
tributors is vertical. However, when the distributors are able to
induce a supplier to effect the termination of one of their com-
petitors, the substantive competitive impact of the parties' conduct
is horizontal.
This distinction between horizontal and vertical conduct is
critical. Indeed, the distinction should determine the outcome of
mixed termination cases. Terminations horizontally induced by
competing distributors should be illegal because their only pur-
pose and effect is to limit competition; however, terminations
vertically imposed by a supplier should be upheld because they are
almost always intended to promote interbrand competition.
TRUST BULL. 467, 495-96 (1990). The Justice Department has opposed each of these bills.
See id. at 496; 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1548, at 29 (January 16, 1992).
5 See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 730; see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 608 (1972); ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 556 (8th Cir. 1991),
cat. denied, 112 S. CL 1176 (1992).
6 e, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Unfortunately, in recent years most federal courts have not
adopted such a substantive means of distinguishing permissible
from illegal distributor terminations. Instead of considering wheth-
er a termination was carried out independently by a manufacturer
or coerced by another distributor, the courts have been preoccu-
pied with whether a termination was effected to enforce a "price"
or "nonprice" vertical restraint. This distinction bears little, if any,
relationship to the economic purpose or effect of a distributor
termination.7 Many courts have recognized the, illogic of the
price/nonprice .distinction, but unable to expressly overrule the
distinction, they have attempted instead to limit the circumstances
in which terminated distributors can prove resale price-fixing 8
The culmination of this approach in the Monsanto and Sharp cases,
and in their progeny in the lower federal courts, eliminated most
distributors' antitrust claims and prompted Congress to intervene
on their behalf. The Price Fixing Prevention Act, however, is just
as deficient as the current judicial approach. The Act continues to
concentrate on the formalistic distinction between price and
nonprice vertical restraints. Indeed, the Act expressly codifies the
per se rule against resale price maintenance.9 The Act also pushes
the judicial pendulum back too far in favor of terminated distribu-
tors. The Act permits terminated distributors to reach a jury on
the basis of ambiguous evidence of a resale price-fixing conspiracy
between a manufacturer and competitors of the terminated deal-
er."0 The conspiracy standard set forth in the Act is likely to de-
ter manufacturers from effecting terminations legitimately intend-
ed to enhance their competitive efficiency.
A middle ground between the extreme approaches of Con-
gress and certain of the federal courts is still available to the fed-
eral judiciary. This Article sets forth a theoretical basis under
which the courts could concentrate on the legitimate economic
7 See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 63115 and accompanying text.
9 See 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 652 (May 9, 1991); 60
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1521, at 847 (June 20, 1991); 60 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 841 (June 25, 1992).
10 Under the Act, a manufacturer may be liable if a complaint from a competitor is
the "major cause" of a decision to terminate a distributor. Thus, "the existence of one
complaint about price in the files of the manufacturer could lead to a plausible infer-
ence that the complaint was the 'major cause' of the termination so as to make summary
judgment [for the defendant] virtually impossible." See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
S. REP. No. 42, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 26 (1991) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (on the
Consumer Protection Against Price Fixing Act of 1991).
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differences between horizontal and vertical conduct rather than on
the formalistic distinction between price and nonprice restraints. A
horizontal/vertical dichotomy for distributor terminations has been
proposed by this author in earlier articles,1 1 and the federal
courts now seem to have laid the theoretical groundwork for ac-
cepting such an approach. The "ancillary restraints doctrine," first
set forth by Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft in 1898, has recently
been revitalized explicitly by a few lower federal courts and implic-
itly by the Supreme Court. 2 This doctrine provides a basis for
substituting a horizontal/vertical dichotomy in distributor termina-
tion cases for the price/nonprice distinction. Indeed, in recent
cases a few lower federal courts have expressly adopted a horizon-
tal/vertical dichotomy for distributor terminations."3
Many courts and commentators have concluded that Monsanto
and Sharp bar the approach to distributor terminations proposed
in this article because the relevant inquiry under these decisions is
not the source of a termination but its specific effect on competi-
tion in a relevant market. 4 However, the source of a termination
in itself reveals its competitive effect. The courts can thus use the
horizontal/vertical dichotomy as a shorthand method of determin-
ing the market impact of a distributor termination. The Supreme
Court has, in fact, recently recognized the utility of the horizon-
tal/vertical dichotomy. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services Inc.,'5 the Supreme Court held that Kodak's refusal to
deal with discounters who had been competing with it in the parts
and service aftermarket could be deemed illegal on its face. The
Court pointed out that, because the conduct at issue was horizon-
tal rather than vertical, it could be found illegal without a full
11 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing. The Horizontal!Vertical Dicwtomy in Distrib-
utor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY Lj. 311 (1989); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Termi-
nations Pursuant to Consiracies Among a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested
Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (1982).
12 See United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). For a discussion of recent applications of the Addyston Pipe doctrine,
see infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
13 See ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991), cert denieAd
112 S. Ct. 1176 (1992); Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Minn.
1991); Arnold-Pontiac GMC v. General Motors Corp., 700 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
14 See Bailey's Inc. v. Windsor America, Inc., 948 F.2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1991); Ben
Elfman & Son, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp 683 (D. Mass. 1991); Toys "R"
Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Michael Waldman &
Jonathon W. Cuneo, The Court is Winking at "Price Fixing" N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1988, at
F2.
15 112 S. Ct. 2042 (1992).
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market analysis.' 6 Eastman Kodak represents a shift by the Court
away from the manufacturer-oriented approach of Monsanto and
Sharp. Under the rationale of Eastman Kodak, once a distributor
proves that its termination was induced by a competitor, the termi-
nation should be deemed illegal without any further inquiry.'
Additional support for the horizontal/vertical dichotomy pro-
posed in this Article can be found in several other cases decided
by the Supreme Court during the last fifteen years. These cases
can be viewed as establishing a new form of antitrust analysis as
an intermediate standard between the traditional "per se" and
"rule of reason" approaches. Under this new standard, the courts
could inquire into whether a distributor termination was horizon-
tally or vertically motivated. Once they had determined the parties'
intent, they would not have to engage in an* inquiry into the spe-
cific competitive effects of the termination." By referring to such
precedent, the courts could fashion a new approach to distributor
terminations that is neither as harsh to manufacturers as the pro-
posed federal legislation nor as difficult for terminated distributors
as the popular judicial interpretations of Monsanto and Sharp.
II. THEORETICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE
CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACH
A. The Per Se/Rule of Reason Conundrum
The analysis of mixed termination cases has suffered from the
courts' inability to choose a consistent theoretical basis for evaluat-
ing defendants' conduct. Traditionally, the federal courts have
been preoccupied with whether a "per se" or "rule of reason"
analysis should apply in such cases. Indeed, the outcome of mixed
termination cases has usually depended upon the form of analysis
chosen by a court. To date, most courts have regarded the per se
rule and the rule of reason as opposite approaches to antitrust
analysis. Under the per se rule, a defendant is conclusively pre-
sumed to have committed an antitrust violation when it engages in
certain types of prohibited conduct. Once the conduct is proven,
the defendant cannot escape liability by arguing that it had a
procompetitive purpose or that the conduct had a beneficial ef-
fect.9 In contrast, under the rule of reason, the presumptions
16 Id. at 2084 n.18.
17 See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
19 See, e-g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (hor-
19921
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are in favor of the defendant. A plaintiff must prove a specific
adverse effect on competition in a relevant market in order to
prevail. The courts have felt compelled in rule of reason cases to
consider every factor that might conceivably bear on the competi-
tive purpose or effect of the restriction in question, including the
defendant's share of the relevant product and geographic mar-
kets.2" The requirement that plaintiffs prove a defendant's market
power has been particularly burdensome.2 In fact, plaintiffs have
so rarely prevailed in rule of reason cases that the approach has
been equated with a rule of per se legality.22
The traditional per se and rule of reason approaches thus
inevitably result in opposite outcomes in antitrust cases. Courts
applying the per se rule to mixed terminations have found them
to be illegal on their face.2" Under the rule of reason, however,
terminated distributors have been unable to prove the requisite
izontal price-fixing); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal
allocation of customers and territories).
20 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court
stated that, "[u]nder this rule, the factfinder weighs all the circumstances of a case in
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition." Id. at 49 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 288 (1918)). The Sharp Court cited Sylvania's broad definition of the rule of
reason. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 723; see also Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-
Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price-Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983)
(referring to 'rule of reason' approach in which all relevant competitive factors are tak-
en into account").
21 Professor Areeda has observed that proof of market power is "difficult, complex,
expensive and time-consuming." Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rul,
54 ANTrrRusr L.J. 27, 28 (1985). A current Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has described the "exhaustive and exhausting document production by the ...
parties both" in and close to the market, endless debates about elasticity of supply and
demand, and all the minutiae that may need to be tied down in a full rule of reason
case." Mary L. Azcuenaga, Market Power as a Screen in Evaluating Horizontal Restraints, 60
ANTrrRus LJ. 935, 940 (1992). Indeed, the Commissioner concluded that, when a mar-
ket power inquiry is required under the rule of reason, most "cases would not be
brought simply because the litigation cost would outweigh the benefits of the case .
Id at 986.
22 See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV.
933, 949 (1987) ("[Als a practical matter, current case law treats all [nonprice] ...
vertical restraints as lawful per se [under the rule of reason]."). In fact, only two cases
decided in the last fifteen years have found vertical restrictions to be illegal tinder the
rule of reason. See Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (lth Cir. 1983)
(airtight territorial restriction imposed by supplier which also operated at resale level);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (warranty "pass-over"
fee involving competing distributors).
23 See Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983);
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Lovett v. General
Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Minn. 1991).
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injury to competition, and their claims have been dismissed on
summary judgment.24
B. The Price/NonPrice Dichotomy
Most courts have adopted the price/nonprice dichotomy as
the basis for making the critical distinction between per se and
rule of reason conduct. Unfortunately, this approach is based
more on judicial tradition than on the actual economic purpose
or effect of mixed terminations.
The price/nonprice dichotomy stems from the Supreme
Court's 1977 decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc.' Sylvania is widely viewed as the Supreme Court's seminal
recognition of the need to base antitrust rules on economic effect
rather than on social goals such as the independence of small
business.26 In Sylvania, however, the Court stopped short of view-
ing the substantive economic purpose and impact of all conduct
as determinative. Sylvania created a fundamental dichotomy be-
tween price and nonprice vertical restraints. The Court recognized
that the rule of reason should apply to nonprice vertical restric-
tions because of their potential beneficial effect on competition.
However, the Court was unwilling to overrule its long-established
rule on the per se illegality of resale price maintenanceY Thus,
future choices between per se and rule of reason analysis would
have to be made on the basis of whether a supplier was enforcing
a price or nonprice vertical restraint. This distinction would be
difficult to make in subsequent cases because a manufacturer of-
ten has identical procompetitive purposes for these two types of
vertical restraints.
24 Se The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988); Garment
District, Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1005 (1988); McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1986), cart deni.d 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
25 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
26 See Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance
Afier Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of
Proof and Boycotts, 72 VA. L REV. 1015, 1017 (1986).
27 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). The rule
was first established in 1911 in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911), and was subsequently reaffirmed on several occasions. See Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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At issue in Sylvania was a contractual requirement that distrib-
utors sell Sylvania television sets only from authorized locations.
Although this requirement limited competition among the distrib-
utors in the resale of Sylvania televisions ("intrabrand competi-
tion"), the Court recognized that the restrictions also allowed
Sylvania to achieve certain efficiencies in competing against other
television manufacturers ("interbrand competition")." The territo-
rial protection afforded by the location clauses could, for example,
induce distributors to make the investments necessary to provide
more services to customers, thereby making the Sylvania brand
more attractive to consumers. The Court noted that "because of
market imperfections such as the so-called 'free-rider' effect," such
services might not be provided by retailers in the absence of verti-
cal restrictions.' In implementing such restrictions a supplier was
likely to be exercising its best judgment on how to compete most
effectively against other brands.' Emphasizing that such
interbrand competition "is the primary concern of antitrust law,"
the Court concluded that a rule of per se illegality was not appro-
priate for nonprice vertical restrictions such as Sylvania's location
clause.31 Departure from the rule of reason standard, the Court
pointed out, "must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing."32 In analyzing
nonprice vertical restrictions, a court should use the rule of reason
to balance any restriction of intrabrand competition against the
beneficial impact on interbrand competition.33
28 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-57.
29 Id. at 55. The "free-rider" effect occurs when certain retailers providing high-cost
presale services to customers (such as product demonstrations and advice) compete with
other retailers who can charge a lower price because they do not provide such services.
See F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST UJ. 687, 694 (1983).
The low-cost retailer "free-rides" on the services provided by the other retailers. Frequent-
ly customers will obtain necessary product information and advice from the high-cost'
retailer and then purchase the product from the 'free-rider" at a lower price. If enough
customers are diverted by the free-rider, the high-cost retailers may ultimately be forced
to cease providing customer services in order to remain competitive in the intrabrand
market. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON.
86 (1960); Dennis 0. Doherty, Note, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.: Monsanto's Progeny and the Congressional Proposal to Codij& the Per Se Rule Against
Vertical Price Fixing, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 992 (1989).
30 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56. Indeed, the Court concluded that, because manufac-
turers had a natural interest in insuring a low-cost, high-volume distribution policy, they
would not be likely to limit intrabrand competition any more than was necessary to stim-
ulate interbrand competition. Id. at 56.
31 Id. at 52 n.19, 56-59.
32 Id. at 59.
33 Id. at 54-57. By this holding, the Court overruled its 1967 decision in United
[Vol. 68:271
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The Sylvania Court did not extend this rule of reason ap-
proach to resale price restrictions. In a footnote, the Court stated
that the per se rule should continue to apply to vertical price-
related restraints because they "involve significantly different ques-
tions of analysis and policy."'M However, as Justice White recog-
nized in his concurring opinion, "the economic arguments in
favor of allowing vertical non-price restraints generally apply to
vertical price restrictions as well."" Resale price restrictions can
be just as effective as nonprice restrictions in insuring customer
services. Both types of restrictions can be designed to afford dis-
tributors a sufficient resale margin to afford such services.- In-
deed, resale price restraints are a less stringent means of encour-
aging customer services. Vertical territorial restraints can preclude-
all competition between distributors in the resale of the supplier's
products, but resale price restraints allow distributors to continue
to compete in other areas, such as the delivery of customer servic-
es.
37
The price/nonprice dichotomy adopted in Sylvania is particu-
larly difficult to make in mixed termination cases. Under Sylvania,
the rule of reason would apply when a supplier terminated a dis-
tributor to enforce a nonprice vertical restraint, but the per se
rule would apply if the termination was for a price-related- reason.
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which had applied the per se rule
to nonprice vertical restraints.
34 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. The Court noted that, unlike nonprice restraints,
resale price restrictions might facilitate cartelizing. Cartels, however, are subject to direct
per se attack as unjustified horizontal restrictions on competition. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text. A per se rule against resale price restraints is therefore not necessary
to prevent cartelization. The more likely rationale for the Court's continuation of the per
se rule was the second reason cited in Sylvania: "Congress['] . . . approval of a per se
analysis of vertical price restrictions." Id. For a discussion of the history of congressional'
support for a per se approach, see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
35 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring).
36 Several commentators have pointed out the economic equivalence of price and
nonprice vertical restraints. Se e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTrTRusT PARADox 289
(1978); Wesley J. Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Wdfare: Business Electron-
ics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 36 UCLA L. REv. 889, 893 (1989).
37 'The territorial restriction affects both price and service competition; the price
restriction affects only price competition." Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Resicted Distribution. Per Se Legaliy, 48 U. Cmi. L. REv. 6, 9 (1981). See also
Panel Discussion, Antitrust Do's and Don'ts of Distribution, 53 ANTrrRUST L.J. 363, 377-78
(1984) (comments of Harry M. Reasoner). In Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg
Instruments, 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 833 (1978), the First Circuit
held that a manufacturer could control a dealer's resale prices on sales outside of the
dealer's territory because the impact on competition would be less than if the manufac-
turer had imposed an airtight territorial restriction forbidding such sales entirely.
19921
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The distinction between "price" and "nonprice" reasons for a ter-
mination, however, is illusory. A manufacturer may be concerned
about a dealer's narrow resale margins because they prevent the
dealer from providing customer services. Thus, a dealer may com-
plain to a manufacturer about another dealer's price-cutting, and
the manufacturer may legitimately respond by terminating the
dealer for a "nonprice" reason such as the failure to provide ade-
quate assistance to consumers.
In Monsanto and Sharp the Supreme Court was rightfully con-
cerned about a court's ability to distinguish legitimate "nonprice"
motives from illegal "price-related" motives in mixed termination
cases. An obvious solution to this problem simply would have been
to overrule the per se illegality of resale price restrictions and
apply an identical rule of reason analysis to all vertical restraints.
However, the Monsanto and Sharp Courts were no more capable of
overruling the per se illegality of resale price maintenance than
was the Sylvania Court. Prompted either by stare decisis or by
clear congressional opposition to a change in analysis,' the
Court in both cases reaffirmed the per se approach.3 9
With a clear distinction between price and nonprice vertical
restraints so firmly established, the Court faced a difficult dilem-
ma: how to protect Sylvania's recognition of the potential benefi-
cial effects of nonprice vertical restraints when nearly indistin-
guishable price-related restraints were per se illegal. The Court's
solution in Monsanto and Sharp was to restrict the circumstances in
which the per se rule could be invoked. In its zeal to protect the
38 Congressional actions since the mid-1970s have demonstrated consistent support
for the per se rule against resale price maintenance. In 1975, Congress repealed the so-
called "fair trade" exemption for certain state-authorized resale price maintenance
agreements. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (1988). When
Congress repealed the fair trade laws, it "fully understood that it was adopting the per se
rule prohibiting vertical price-fixing." John F. Seiberling, Congresas Makes Laws: The Executive
Should Enforce, Them, 53 ANTrTRUST LJ. 175, 177 (1984). Appropriations bills for the De-
partment of Justice during the 1980s consistently prohibited the use of funds for altering
the per se rule against resale price maintenance. See White House Opposes Authorization of
Justice Department with RPM Rider, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1320, at
1127 (June 18, 1987). A 1985 House of Representatives resolution criticized the Vertical
Restraints Guidelines of the Department of Justice for "qualifying the accepted rule that
vertical price-fixing in any context is illegal per se." H.R.J. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
131 Cong. Rec. H9324 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1985). The versions of the Price Fixing Preven-
tion Act passed by the House and Senate in the 102d Congress codify the per se rule
against resale price-fixing. See 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 652
(May 9, 1991); 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1521, at 847 (June 20, 1991).
39 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
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Sylvania doctrine, the Court adopted formalistic grounds for distin-
guishing between per se and rule of reason conduct. Indeed, the
approach taken by the Court in Monsanto and Sharp violated its
own admonition in Sylvania that antitrust analysis be based on
"demonstrable economic effect."4° In Monsanto the Court con-
cluded that a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutting distrib-
utor "in response to" complaints from higher priced dealers was
insufficient to raise the inference of a resale price-fixing conspira-
cy.41 In Sharp the Court termed the induced termination of a
discounter a "nonprice vertical restraint" subject to rule of reason
analysis.42 A per se illegal conspiracy could only be found, the
Court concluded, in those rare cases in which the supplier and
remaining distributor agreed on the specific resale price to be
charged after a discounter's termination.
Precluded by Monsanto and Sharp from proceeding under a
per se theory, terminated distributors' only alternative in the lower
federal courts has been the rule of reason. Plaintiffs have had
little chance of prevailing under traditional rule of reason theo-
ries, which require proof of specific adverse market effects. 4 In-
deed, following Sharp, most lower federal courts have dismissed
terminated distributors' claims even in the face of substantial evi-
dence that the terminations were induced by a competitor. 5
III. MIXED TERMINATION LAW PRIOR TO MONSANTO
The federal courts' approach to mixed termination cases has
not always been so formalistic. In a series of cases prior to the
Monsanto decision in 1984, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts concentrated on the legitimate economic difference be-
tween horizontal and vertical conduct rather than on the formalis-
tic distinction between price and nonprice restraints.
40 Sylvania 433 U.S. at 59.
41 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763.
42 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 727.
43 Id.
44 Terminated distributors find it nearly impossible to prevail under the rule of
reason because they cannot show a specific adverse competitive effect in the interbrand
market. After the termination of a distributor, total sales of the relevant brand may be
unaffected, and prices in the interbrand market may not immediately increase. Thus, no
general "injury to competition" occurs in the interbrand market because "neither aggre-
gate output nor prices have changed." Harry S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws:
Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. CORP. L. 1, 11-12 (1986).
45 See infra cases cited in notes 86-87, 113-14.
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In Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc.,4 a, retailer induced
certain appliance manufacturers and distributors to sell to a com-
peting retailer (Klor's) only at discriminatorily high prices. The
Court pointed out that the inducing retailer had initiated a
"group boycott" by enlisting the support of firms at a different
competitive level to take the adverse action against Klor's. The
Court applied the per se rule despite the seemingly vertical form
of the conspiracy. It was sufficient for illegality that Klor's had
been driven out of the appliance distribution business as a result
of the actions of one of its competitors.
47
In United States v. General Motors Corp.,' the group boycott
was organized by several Chevrolet dealers who induced General
Motors to prohibit its dealers from selling automobiles to discount-
ers. The Court recognized that the vertical form of the conspiracy
should not insulate the defendants from per se liability.49 Indeed,
the Court pointed out that, by convincing General Motors to par-
ticipate in the arrangement, the Chevrolet dealers had made their
conspiracy to exclude discounters from the market even more
effective than it otherwise would have been.50
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc."1 involved agreements
among a group of grocery stores not to sell the Topco private
46 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
47 Id. at 212-13.
48 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
49 One court has explained that the Supreme Court's application of the per se rule
in General Motors "points to the importance of the underlying horizontal nature of the
arrangement .... Substance should be more important than form." Battle v. Lubrizol
Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 1982), af'd sub nom. Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238
(8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); see also ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM
Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[A]ithough General Motors' action on
its face seemingly imposed a vertical restraint in response to vertical activity from individ-
ual dealers, it came as a result of inducements emanating from a horizontal agreement
among the dealers to constrain competitive activity at the same dealer level."), cert. denied
112 S. Ct. 1176 (1992).
50 General Motors, 384 U.S. at 144. Inducement of aid from a higher competitive
level has been recognized as the defining characteristic of a group boycott. See Richard
M. Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MICH. L. REV. 671 (1966):
[A]n economic boycott requires the cooperation of a party at a different level in
the distribution process from that on which the instigators operate. Even though
members of an industry wish to punish or eliminate a certain competitor, they
can do so only by inducing the competitor's customers or suppliers to stop deal-
ing with him.
Id. at 674-75; see also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANITnRUST §
148 (1977).
51 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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label brand in each other's territories. The defendants had formed
a single entity to act as their purchasing agent and to license each
store to sell the Topco brand. Despite the apparent vertical form
of the arrangement, the Court looked to the competitive sub-
stance of the defendants' conduct and termed it a per se illegal
horizontal allocation of territories.52
Sylvania, which was decided after each of these cases, did not
limit the per se analysis of Kior's, General. Motors, and Topco. The
Court made clear in Sylvania that its new rule of reason approach
for nonprice vertical iestrictions should not apply to horizontally
induced restraints. The Court specifically cited General Motors and
Tpco with approval and confirmed that "there is 'no doubt that"
the per se rule should continue to apply to "horizontal restrictions
originating in agreements among... retailers.""3 Thus, in addi-
tion to creating the price/nonprice dichotomy, the Sylvania Court
also reaffirmed the more rational economic distinction between
horizontal and vertical conduct.
In the years immediately after the Sylvania decision, the lower
federal courts had several occasions in which to consider the dis-
tinction between horizontal and vertical conduct in mixed termina-
tion cases. Retail discounting became more prevalent as inflation
grew in the late 1970s. Consumers began to search out low-price
dealers as a means of minimizing inflationary price increases. In
an attempt to protect their customer base, full-price retailers com-
plained more frequently' to suppliers about cost cutting by their
competitors.' In a series of cases the lower federal courts fo-
cused on the antitrust implications of terminations of price-cutting
distributors allegedly induced by such complaints. Several courts
held that these terminations were per se illegal because they had
horizontal effects, even though they were the product of what
could be characterized as a vertical agreement.
In many of these cases, only one distributor was the alleged
instigator of a competitor's termination. Thus the form of the
agreement was entirely vertical (that is, between the supplier and
a single instigating dealer). Nevertheless, several courts concluded
that such terminations should be per se illegal because they elimi-
nated competition at the resale level for no beneficial purpose. In
52 Id. at 608, 610-11.
53 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977).
54 &e William G. Southlard, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.: Providing Up-
stream and Downstream Concrted Aaion, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 681-82 (1985).
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Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.,55 for example, a retailer of
kitchen cabinets convinced a cabinet manufacturer to terminate a
competing retailer who was discounting the cabinets. Instead of
classifying the termination as vertical and applying a Sylvania rule
of reason analysis, the court recognized that the horizontal com-
petitive effect of the termination mandated a per se approach:
When a manufacturer acts on its own, in pursuing its own
market strategy, it is seeking to compete with other manufac-
turers by imposing what may be defended as reasonable vertical
restraints. This would appear to be the rationale of the GTE
Sylvania decision. However, if the action of a manufacturer or
other supplier is taken at the direction of its customer, the
restraint becomes primarily horizontal in nature in that one
customer is seeking to suppress its competition by utilizing the
power of a common supplier. Therefore, although the termina-
tion in such a situation is, itself, a vertical restraint, the desired
impact is horizontal and on the dealer, not the manufacturer,
level .... It is just this type of conduct that the antitrust laws
were designed to reach.'s
Many federal courts subsequently adopted the Cernuto approach
and applied the per se rule when a single distributor induced a
supplier to terminate a competing distributor. Several other
courts indicated in dicta that they would follow the Cernuto
rule. 8
55 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
56 Id. at 168-69.
57 See Zidell Explorations Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (valve
distributor induced foreign manufacturer to terminate competitor); Alloy Intern. Co. v.
Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980) (bearing distributor terminated
at request of competitor); Sport Shoe of Newark, Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., Inc., 512 F.
Supp. 921 (D. Del. 1981) (shoe retailer induced supplier not to sell to new retailer at
nearby location). The Cernuto approach was anticipated as early as 1963 in Girardi v.
Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963), where the court found a belt manufac-
turer per se liable for conspiring with a distributor to terminate one of its price-cutting
competitors.
In Cemuto and many of its progeny the terminated distributor was a price-cutter.
Thus, in addition to the anticompetitive horizontal aspects of the termination, the courts
were able to use resale price maintenance as a rationale for applying the per se rule. See,
e.g., Cernuto, 595 F.2d at 170; Zidell Explorations, 719 F.2d at 1469-70. However, some
courts expressly recognized that the per se rule is appropriate whenever one or more dis-
tributors induce a supplier to terminate a rival, regardless of whether the maintenance of
resale prices is a specific object of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Sport Shoe, 512 F. Supp. at 924
(termination of potential competitor at behest of distributor per se illegal even in ab-
sence of price-related motive).
58 See Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235, 1237 (8th Cir. 1983) (en
banc), cet. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698
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The Cernuto approach, was not, however, unanimously followed
in the federal courts. Some circuit courts found it impossible to
disregard the outward vertical form of a termination induced by a
single competitor. In Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Co.,59 for example,
Sears Roebuck Co., the plaintiff's principal competitor in the re-
sale of vacuum cleaners, had convinced Whirlpool to stop selling
vacuum cleaners to the plaintiff. The court held that the per se
rule could not apply because there was no horizontal plurality,
that is, two or more defendants -on the same distribution level.'
Several other circuit courts have adopted an approach similar to
Oredk and denied application of the per se rule when only one
distributor allegedly induced a rival's termination."
Such an approach to mixed terminations is arbitrary. For a
finding of illegality, it should suffice that a termination was moti-
vated by the anticompetitive demands of one or more competing
distributors rather than by the procompetitive interbrand concerns
of the supplier. The competitive evil in mixed termination cases
results from the naked restriction of intrabrand competition effect-
ed by the conspiracy, not from the number of distributors on the
inducing level.
IV. THE EFFECr OF MONSANTO AND SHARP ON
MIXED TERMINATION LAW
Monsanto and Sharp represented a retreat from the substantive
approach under which many federal courts had been analyzing
distributor termination cases. In Monsanto and Sharp the Supreme
Court reverted to a formalistic analysis of mixed terminations. This
reversion was caused by the Court's dissatisfaction with the per se
rule against resale price maintenance. Unable to directly overrule
the per se approach, the Court nevertheless .attempted to limit the
circumstances in which the rule would apply. In Monsanto the
Court did so by reinvigorating a formalistic distinction between
F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d
742, 743 (7th Cir. 1982); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 988-90 (8th Cir. 1982),
afj'd sub nom. Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 931 (1984); Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1982); Con-
tractor Util. Sales v. Certain-Teed Prods., 638 F.2d 1061, 1072 (7th Cir. 1981).
59 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), rct. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
60 Id. at 131-32.
61 See, e.g., Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir.
1986); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
deni 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
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unilateral and concerted conduct which had been established early
in the century.
Liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act is predicated on
the existence of a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade."6 2 Thus, a unilaterally adopted distribution poli-
cy does not violate section 1. The Supreme Court recognized as
early as 1919 that a manufacturer could not be liable for resale
price maintenance when it acted on its own to implement a par-
ticular distribution policy. In United States v. Colgate Co.,' the
Court held that a manufacturer had the right to announce its sug-
gested resale prices in advance and unilaterally refuse to deal with
any customers who would not agree to observe the prices.
In the sixty-five years between the Colgate and Monsanto deci-
sions, the Court progressively narrowed the Colgate doctrine. Any
action taken by a supplier, beyond a simple refusal to deal, to
insure or enforce adherence to its resale prices was deemed suffi-
cient to infer a per se illegal resale price-fixing conspiracy. 4 In
many cases the action consisted of a form of coercion aimed at
forcing an unwilling buyer to comply with the manufacturer's sug-
gested resale prices.' By the time of Monsanto, "relatively lit-
ie ... [was] left of the [Colgate] doctrine. '"
The Monsanto Court revitalized the Colgate doctrine. Spray-Rite,
a distributor of Monsanto products, had alleged that competing
distributors' complaints about Spray-Rite's failure to comply with
Monsanto's suggested resale prices had caused Monsanto to effect
its termination.67 The Seventh Circuit had held that proof of ter-
mination "in response to" the complaints was sufficient to infer a
62 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
63 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
64 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (attempts to solicit customers of
noncomplying party); United States v. Parke, Davis.& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (threats to
withhold deliveries); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944)
(enlisting assistance of wholesalers in assuring retailers' compliance); FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (enforcement through special agents, blacklists, and
refusals to deal); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (efforts to
enforce resale prices through licensing contracts).
65 See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 45-47; Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. at
723; A. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. at 95, 99-100; Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. at 454-55;
Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 729 F.2d 676, 686 (10th Cir.) (threats of termina-
tion), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1984); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 54-55 (2d
Cir. 1980) (threats of termination).
66 Posner, supra note 37, at 23 n.62; see also Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agree-
ment Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Dea, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655,
685 (1962).
67 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 756-59 (1984).
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resale price-fixing conspiracy.' The Supreme Court emphasized
that "distributors are an important source of information for man-
ufacturers". and that "[a] manufacturer and its distributors have
legitimate reasons to exchange information about... prices."' A
manufacturer could be concerned about its ditributors' resale
margins for proper "nonprice" reasons, such as the need to assure
that "distributors earn sufficient profit" to pay for various presale
services.7 . Indeed, under Colgate, a manufacturer could unilater-
ally refuse to deal with distributors who failed to comply with its
suggested resale prices. If an inference of conspiracy could be
drawn from ambiguous evidence such as the receipt of price-cut-
ting complaints, the beneficial exchange of resale pricing informa-
tion would be deterred and a manufacturer's rights under Colgate
would be unduly limited.71 Terminated distributors would there-
fore have to prove "something more" than a supplier's mere re-
ceipt of complaints:
Permitting an-agreement to be inferred merely from the exis-
tence of complaints, or even from the fact that termination
came about "in response to" complaints, could deter or penal-
ize perfectly legitimate conduct.
[S]omething more than evidence of complaints is needed.
There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were
acting independently .... [T]he antitrust plaintiff should
present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends
to prove that the manufacturer and others "had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
68 Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1239 (7th Cir. 1982). Pri-
or to Monsanto,. the circuit courts were divided over whether a manufacturer's mere re-
ceipt of complaints from other distributors about a terminated distributor's price-cutting
was sufficient to support an inference of a per se illegal resale price-fixing conspiracy.
For cases finding the receipt of complaints to be sufficient, see Bostick Oil Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp.; 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), celt denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Battle v.
Lubrizol Corp., 673-F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982), affld sub no=. Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d
1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Girardi v. Gates Rubber
Co., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963). For cases requiring evidence of something more, see
Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1982); Davis-Watkins Co. v.
Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984);
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007
(1982); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1982), af'd, 712 F.2d
1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Edward J. Sweeney &
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
69 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762.
70 Id. at 762-63.
71 Id. at 761, 763.
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unlawful objective."72
The Court pointed out that proof of such a conscious commit-
ment would require evidence that a distributor had willingly partic-
ipated in a supplier's resale price-fixing scheme. A plaintiff would
have to show "both that the distributor communicated its acquies-
cence or agreement [to resale price-fixing], and that this was
sought by the manufacturer."
73
In reaffirming Colgate, the Monsanto Court diverted attention
from the substantive economic effect of defendants' activities to
the formalistic distinction between unilateral and concerted con-
duct. The Court's concentration on the conspiracy issue implied
that the simple existence of an agreement was enough to prove
liability under section 1. The mutual agreement of a supplier and
complaining distributor to effect another distributor's termination,
however, does not prove that the termination had an anticompeti-
tive effect. Indeed, the Colgate doctrine, as reborn in Monsanto,
bears no relationship to the economic purpose or effect of
defendants' conduct in mixed termination cases. Even the
Monsanto Court conceded that the economic effect of unilateral
and concerted action "is in many, but not all, cases similar or
identical.... JIudged from a distance, the conduct of the parties
in the various situations can be indistinguishable."74 There is no
difference in economic effect between a distributor's willing com-
pliance in a resale price maintenance program, which would be
illegal under Monsanto, and its unwilling compliance, which
Monsanto implied would be permissible. In fact, earlier cases had
taken the view that unuilling compliance would have a more ad-
verse economic effect.7
5
72 Id. at 763-64 (quoting Edward J Sweeney & Sons, 637 F.2d at 111.). Sweeney, like
Monsanto. had involved a claim that a price-cutting distributor was terminated following
the manufacturer's receipt of complaints from competitors. The court held that the mere
receipt of complaints was not sufficient to infer the existence of a resale price-fixing
conspiracy. Edwardj Sweeney & Sons, 637 F.2d at 111.
73 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.9.
74 Id. at 762; see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRICE FIXING PREVENTION Acr
OF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 237, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1991) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]
('The [Monsanto] Court would not have strained common usage or precedent if it had
found instead that a manufacturer's refusal to deal with a distributor, or its threat of
such action resulting in a distributor's compliance with announced policy, constituted
concerted action.").
75 See cases cited supra note 64. By requiring "communicated acquiescence" in a
resale price maintenance conspiracy, Monsanto appeared to change the rationale for infer-
ring conspiracy (which had previously been based upon a manufacturer's coercion of a
distributor's unwilling compliance) to a voluntary standard. There was no discernable cco-
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The Court's requirement for a "conscious commitment to a
common scheme"7 6 was borrowed from horizontal antitrust cases,
in which the requirement makes more sense.77 Parties at the
same distribution level are likely to share the same anticompetitive
purpose for a restraint. In the vertical context, however, the par-
ties have different competitive purposes for agreeing to a restraint
on competition. The supplier's purpose for effecting a termination
is to promote interbrand competition, while the distributors' pur-
pose in inducing a termination is to limit competition among
themselves. 7 The most important issue in a mixed termination
case is thus not whether a supplier and complaining distributor
each had a "conscious commitment" to a termination; it is usually
obvious that they did. The decisive factor should be which party's
purposes were intended to be served by the termination.
Monsanto provides no economic guideposts for the courts to
use in determining the legality of a mixed termination, but only
uncertain distinctions between independent and concerted ac-
tions.79 In fact, the Monsanto Court never explained how it ap-
plied its new conspiracy standard to the facts of the case. Despite
the Court's language establishing a high threshold for inferring a
conspiracy, the Court affirmed a $10.5 million judgment against
Monsanto.' The facts emphasized by the Court were circumstan-
tial and gave little, if any, indication of a meeting of the minds
between Monsanto and the complaining distributors. The Court
appeared to hold Monsanto liable on the basis of various actions
taken against other distributors after the termination to enforce
their adherence to resale prices.8 Observers have thus concluded
nomic reason for this change. Indeed, the Court's original distinction between coerced
and willing compliance has been criticized for its lack of economic substance. As one
commentator stated, "the effect on the market was the same in the Colgate unilateral
action situation as in the case where the manufacturer took some additional steps and
thereby became part of an agreement." Jean w. Bums, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element
in Vertical Antitrust Restraints," 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 19 (1990).
76 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764, 768.
77 See Bums, supra note 75, at 88-39.
78 See infa notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
79 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
80 Id- at 765-68.
81 Id. After the termination, Monsanto advised distributors that it would not contin-
ue to supply them with herbicide if they cut their resale prices. This fact was communi-
cated to distributors during the critical spring shipping season when herbicide was in
short supply. Id. at 765 n.10.
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"that the Court's treatment of the facts in Monsanto was inconsis-
tent with the tenor of its rhetoric."
8 2
It is not surprising, then, that the lower federal courts have
found the Monsanto conspiracy standard confusing and difficult to
apply. The lower courts' interpretation of Monsanto has been de-
scribed as a "confusing welter of... semantic formulations."83
Most federal courts have, however, agreed on one aspect of the
Monsanto case: the high hurdle which plaintiffs must meet to sur-
vive summary disposition on the conspiracy issue." This strict in-
terpretation derives from the Monsanto Court's unfortunate state-
ment that even a termination "in response to" complaints is insuf-
ficient to infer a conspiracy.' In many post-Monsanto cases there
was substantial evidence that a termination was effected as a result
of competing distributors' complaints, and yet the courts were
willing to accept any plausible justification offered by a defendant
to rebut the inference of conspiracy.8 6 Indeed, in more than one-
82 Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance After Monsanto: A Doc-
trine Still at War With Itself, 1984 DuKE LJ. 1163, 1197.
83 Mark E. Rozkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and its Rule of Reason: The
Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L REV.
129, 187 (1989); see also Sanford M. Litvack, The Future Viability of the Current Antitrust
Treatment of Vertical Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 955, 957 (1987). The Supreme Court itself
has had difficulty characterizing the Monsanto test. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the Court appeared to interpret Monsanto to
preclude an inference of conspiracy even when the evidence presented by the plaintiff
and defendant was evenly balanced: "[C]onduct as consistent with permissible competition
as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust con-
spiracy." Id. at 588.
84 See, e.g., Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,
Inc., 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment granted for manufacturer despite
evidence that manufacturer sought pricing assurances from dealers); H.C. Hayden Co. v.
Siemens Medical Sys. Inc., 879 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (summary judgment for man-
ufacturer not precluded by evidence of meetings between complaining dealers and manu-
facturer to discuss termination); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,
763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985) (no inference of conspiracy allowed when manufacturer dis-
cussed termination with other dealers).
85 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
86 See e.g., The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988)
(termination consistent with independent action under Colgate despite fact that manufac-
turer received threats that distributors would cease doing business if manufacturer did
not terminate plaintiff); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905 (4th
Cir. 1986) (verdict directed against plaintiff despite evidence of acquiescence to threats
from competing retailer), cert denied 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v.
La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1986) (evidence of termination of discounter
to placate complaining dealer insufficient to raise inference of resale price-fixing con-
spiracy), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988). Thus, under the federal courts' interpretation
of Monsanto, plaintiffs must "disprove the existence of any or all hypothetical explanations
for the manufacturer's conduct that might justify a dealer termination." HOUSE REPORT,
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half of the mixed termination cases decided since Monsanto, the
'courts have granted summary judgement or a directed verdict for
the defendant. 7 Thus, in a very real sense, the language of the
Monsanto decision has triumphed over its holding."
Unlike Monsanto, which concerned the procedural issue of
conspiracy, Sharp dealt with the substantive question of the scope
of the resale price-fixing offense in mixed termination cases. In
Sharp, the Court once again adopted a formalistic basis for limit-
ing the rights of terminated distributors. Because Sharp involved
the substantive definition of an antitrust offense, its holding could
have an even more adverse effect on plaintiffs than Monsanto.
The issue in Sharp was whether the per se rule should apply
when a single distributor induced a supplier to terminate a price-
cutting competitor. The Cernuto line of cases had applied a per se
analysis in such instances, reasoning that an induced termination
amounted to a naked restriction of intrabrand competition with
no redeeming interbrand effect. 9 Other federal courts, however,
had held that, even when a competing distributor induced the
termination of a price cutter, the per se rule should not apply
unless the manufacturer and remaining dealer agreed on a specif-
ic resale price to be charged in the futuref.
It was clear in Sharp that the plaintiff's termination had been
induced by a competitor. Business Electronics Corporation ("Busi-
supra note 74, at 13.
87 Kyle M. N. Jones, Comment, Resale Pice Maintenance and the Evidentiary Standard
for Shennan Act Conspiracy: When Is Enough Enough?, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 713, 729 (1989).
88 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 74, at 23. Some lower federal courts, however,
have considered the facts of Monsanto to be more important than its rhetoric and have
been willing to infer a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Big Apple BMW,
Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,918 (3d Cir. 1992); Heli-
copter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1987);
Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986); Tunis
Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 105 (1986),
and er. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992); Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp.
1506 (D. Minn. 1991).
89 S&e supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. As the court stated in World of
Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
823 (1985), 'The relevant consideration is not whether a specific price is set, but wheth-
er a dealer's independent judgment is eliminated through a coerced agreement." Id. at
1477.
90 See Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1440 (7th Cir. 1986); Westman
Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 1986), cert denieA,
486 U.S. 1005 (1988); National Marine Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190,
193 (4th Cir. 1985); JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983).
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ness Electronics"), a Houston dealer for Sharp Electronics Corp.
("Sharp"), competed with Gilbert Hartwell, the only other Sharp
distributor in Houston. Business Electronics' retail prices were
lower than Hartwell's. Hartwell complained to Sharp on several
occasions about Business Electronics' lower prices. Hartwell finally
gave Sharp an ultimatum: unless Sharp terminated Business Elec-
tronics within thirty days, Hartwell would cease doing business with
Sharp. Sharp responded to Hartwell's threat by terminating Busi-
ness Electronics within the thirty-day period.91 The jury conclud-
ed that Sharp and Hartwell had entered into an agreement to
terminate Business Electronics because of its price-cutting. 92
The Supreme Court held that the per se rule was inapplicable
because Sharp and Hartwell had not agreed on the specific prices
to be charged by Hartwell after Business Electronics' termina-
tion.9" As in Monsanto, the Court feared an overly broad applica-
tion of the per se rule against resale price maintenance. The
Court pointed out that, under a per se approach, a manu-
facturer's termination of a price-cutter would be unduly risky. The
manufacturer would find it difficult to prove that its real motiva-
tion for the termination was to insure adequate customer services
rather than to protect a dealer's profit margin.94 Reaffirming
Sylvania's determination that "interbrand competition is the pri-
mary concern of the antitrust laws,"' the Court concluded that
"a rule of per se illegality . . . was not needed or effective to pro-
tect intrabrand competition."96 The Court stated that the purpose
of the per se rule against resale price maintenance was to prevent
intetbrand cartels.9 7 Vertical price agreements could facilitate such
cartels by "reducing the manufacturer's incentive to cheat...
since its retailers could not pass on lower prices to consumers."98
Retailers, however, would only be prevented from passing along
lower prices when they had agreed with a manufacturer on the
specific resale prices to be charged. Thus, in the absence of such
91 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721 (1988).
92 Id. at 722.
93 I& at 726-27.
94 Id. at 727-28 ("In the vast majority of cases, it will be extremely difficult for the
manufacturer to convince a jury that its motivation was to ensure adequate services, since
price cutting and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand.").
95 Id. at 726.
96 Id. at 725.
97 Id. at 725-26.
98 Id. at 725.
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an agreement, the rule of reason rather than the per se rule
should apply.'
Shaip's requirement for the setting of a specific resale price
merely introduces another formalistic rule into the analysis of
mixed terminations. Like the price/nonprice and unilateral/con-
spiracy dichotomies, the "specific price" standard bears no relation-
ship to substantive economic effect. Indeed, the termination of a
price-cutter at the behest of a competitor can have an even great-
er adverse effect on consumers than a manufacturer's requirement
that a distributor charge a specific resale price. If Sharp had im-
posed resale prices and left Business Electronics and Hartwell free
to compete in Houston in the nonprice arena, consumers at least
could have chosen the dealer who provided the best services. As it
was, however, Business Electronics was completely excluded from
the relevant market. Consumers were left with only one outlet for
Sharp calculators, which could set prices and provide services as it
saw fit without fear of retail competition.
100
Terminating a distributor at a competitor's request has an
indirect effect on pricing in the intrabrand market. The elimina-
tion of a competitor gives the remaining distributors greater power
to control resale prices. Indeed, in Sharp this control was absolute,
because the only other Sharp distributor in the Houston area was
eliminated. The Sharp Court failed to acknowledge that the ad-
verse effect on competitive pricing, though indirect, was no less
than it would have been if Hartwell had agreed to charge a specif-
ic resale price. 101 In other antitrust cases the Supreme Court has
had no difficulty discerning an anticompetitive effect from conduct
indirectly affecting prices. 2 In Sharp the Court conceded that it
99 Id. at 727.
100 As Judge Mansfield argued in his dissenting opinion in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978), the per se
rule should apply in similar circumstances:
Before Oreck was terminated by the Sears-Whirlpool combination as a competing
distributor, the public had the benefit of Oreck's competition, including price
competition, in the marketing of Whirlpool cleaners .... After the termination
the public could buy Whirlpool machines only from Sears at such prices as Sears
might decide, unaffected by any Oreck competition.
Id. at 139.
101 Another court has recognized that "the coerced exclusion of discount rivals from
the market place solely because of their pricing policies" impairs competition as much as
do explicit price-fixing agreements. Burlington Coat Factory v. Belk Bros. Co., 621 F.
Supp. 224, 233 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
102 See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (wholesaler's agree-
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had previously held that antitrust conspiracies need not set specific
prices in order to be per se illegal. However, the Court distin-
guished its earlier cases on the ground that they involved hori-
zontal agreements rather than the "vertical" conduct at issue in
Sharp.10 3
The Sharp Court was most deficient in characterizing Business
Electronics' termination as vertical rather than horizontal conduct.
Business Electronics was not terminated by Sharp to enforce a
nonprice vertical restriction, to prevent free-riding, or to otherwise
promote Sharp's effectiveness in competing against other manufac-
turers of electronic calculators. The only reason for Business
Electronics' termination was to placate a rival dealer concerned
about low-price competition." 4 Hartwell's ultimatum to Sharp
possessed the classic characteristics of a group boycott: the exer-
tion of pressure by a firm at one competitive level to induce a
supplier not to deal with the boycott victim. In its previous group
boycott cases the Court did not characterize the defendants' con-
duct as vertical simply because it was imposed from above. 0 5
However, in Sharp the Court distinguished cases such as General
Motors and Kior's on the ground that they involved "horizontal
combinations" at some competitive level, while only Sharp and
Hartwell were involved in the termination of Business Electron-
ics. 10
6
Under Sharp, the per se rule would presumably apply when
two or more distributors induce a supplier to terminate a fellow
ment to stop extending credit to retailers per se illegal); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (ethical canon forbidding members of orga-
nization from engaging in competitive bidding per se illegal); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (competitors' agreement to buy surplus gasoline to
keep prices from falling per se illegal); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936) (competitors' agreement to observe certain terms of sale per se illegal). As the
Court stated in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), "the per se
rule applies even when the effect upon prices is indirect.L " Id. at 147.
103 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 733-34. The House Report on the Price Fixing Prevention Act
acknowledges that the majority in Sharp failed to recognize the Court's own precedent
for applying the per se rule in similar circumstances. See HOUsE REPORT at 27 (quoting
Piraino, supra note 11, at 330).
104 Justice Stevens dissented in Sharp, arguing that the majority should not have pre-
sumed a procompetitive purpose for Business Electronics' termination (e.g., insuring bet-
ter customer service) when Sharp had not instituted any vertical restrictions on its distrib-
utors to encourage such services. Id. at 740-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Rudolph J.
Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 511, 550-51 (1989);
Steuer, supra note 4, at 512.
105 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
106 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 734.
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distributor; however a court would have to use the rule of reason
when only one distributor caused a supplier to take the same
action. In making this formalistic distinction, the Court showed
less economic discernment than the lower federal courts, which in
the Cernuto line of cases had recognized the horizontal competitive
substance of terminations induced by a single distributor.1 7 In-
deed, the Sharp Court misinterpreted its own precedent, for in
Kior's, as in Sharp, only one retailer induced a supplier to take an
adverse action against a competing retailer.'
What could be more arbitrary than the distinction made in
Sharp between terminations induced by single firms and "horizon-
tal combinations?" The adverse effect on intrabrand competition
was caused by Business Electronics' coerced exclusion from the
Sharp electronic calculator market in Houston, not by the number
of firms who convinced Sharp to effect the termination. Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Sharp that the termination of
Business Electronics was not "different in kind" from the Chevrolet
dealers' coercion in General Motors- "Both boycotts lack any effi-
ciency justification-they are simply naked restraints on price com-
petition, rather than integral, or ancillary, parts of the
manufacturers' predetermined distribution policies. " "
The distinctions courts will now have to make in "single in-
ducement" cases illustrate Sharp's formalism. The per se rule will
apply when the supplier and remaining distributor agree to set a
specific resale price. But when should a court deem this to have
occurred? There are many scenarios in which a manufacturer and
its distributors may have agreed on the price level to be charged
after a distributor's termination. The retailer, for example, may
107 As the court stated in Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir.
1982):
In KIor's, there was only one conspiring party on the same competitive level as
Klor's, i.e., Broadway-Hale. Therefore, numerosity on the same horizontal level as
the boycotted party is not required. Similarly, in General Motors there was only
one party at the manufacturer's level. The application of the group boycott
theory does not turn on the number of parties in a combination; rather it is ap-
plied to prohibit the exclusionary practices inherent in a boycott which are "in-
consistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act"
Id. at 414 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966)); see
also A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1305 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A per
se violation might be established if a manufacturer's decision to terminate a dealer was
prompted by dealer coercion, either by a single dealer or by a group of dealers.").
108 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
109 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 748 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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agree to charge between $1.00 and $1.10 for a particular product,
to charge a particular percentage over wholesale price, or to
charge the same amount as in the previous year."' Or the man-
ufacturer and retailer may play a game in which the retailer sug-
gests a certain price and the manufacturer informs the retailer
whether it is close enough to the desired resale price."1 In
which of these cases have the parties agreed to set a specific resale
price under the Sharp formulation? These distinctions have noth-
ing to do with the economic effect of the conduct at issue, and by
concentrating on them the courts will only divert their attention
from more substantive concerns.
One certainty in the post-Sharp era is that terminated distribu-
tors will find it extremely difficult to prevail in single inducement
cases. Given the sophistication of most antitrust compliance pro-
grams, there usually will be no evidence of a manufacturer's impo-
sition of a specific resale price. As certain commentators have ob-
served, "Under the new rule, any businessman who actually agrees
on the price he will charge should be convicted of stupidity as
well as price fixing.""' And indeed, the lower federal courts
have begun to cite Sharp routinely in dismissing mixed termination
cases that possess the classic characteristics of a group boycott. For
example, in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co.," 3 Macy's
threatened to discontinue purchasing from two swimsuit manufac-
turers if they continued to deal with a Toys "R" Us division selling
swimsuits at a twenty to twenty-five percent discount in competi-
tion with Macy's. Both firms notified Toys "R" Us that they would
no longer deal with it because of the complaints from Macy's.
Despite the similarities to Klor's, the court granted summary
judgment for Macy's on the ground that Macy's had not agreed
with the manufacturers to fix a specific retail price for their
swimwear. 1
14
Because most terminated distributors will be unable to prove
under Sharp that a manufacturer fixed a specific resale price, they
will be forced to proceed under rule of reason rather than per se
theories. A distributor will thus have to show that its termination
110 See Steuer, supra note 4, at 527.
111 See Burns, supra note 75, at 29.
112 Waldman & Cuneo, supra note 14.
113 728 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
114 Id. at 235-36. For other cases denying liability in similar circumstances, see
Bailey's, Inc. v. Windsor Am., Inc., 948 F.2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1991); Ben Elfman Sons, Inc.
v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mass. 1991).
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had an adverse impact on competition in a relevant market. Un-
der standard formulations of the rule of reason, such proof will be
difficult, if not impossible, for most distributors. 15
V. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIXED TERMINATIONS
Monsanto and Sharp have seriously limited the ability of indi-
vidual distributors to prevail in antitrust suits. As a result of these
cases manufacturers will be more willing to terminate distributors
who are the object of price-cutting complaints. The antitrust laws,
however, are designed to protect competition, not individual com-
petitors. The enhancement of consumer welfare, rather than the
protection of small businesses, currently is viewed as the proper
goal of antitrust enforcement." 6  Thus, Monsanto and Sharp
should not be criticized simply because they limit individual
distributors' freedom. A different approach is only justified to
protect the competitive process from general abuses that harm
consumers by raising prices or reducing output.
Under the interpretation of Monsanto and Sharp currently
followed by the lower federal courts, a distributor has no real
remedy when its termination is induced by a competitor. Such
terminations may adversely affect intrabrand competition by in-
creasing retail prices and limiting point-of-sale services. If the
courts intend to follow an economics-based approach to antitrust
policy, they should adopt a new method of analyzing mixed termi-
nations.
A. The Benefits of Intrabrand Competition
Any approach to mixed terminations should recognize that
intrabrand competition is worthy of protection under the antitrust
laws. Although the Supreme Court stated in Sylvania and Sharp
115 See supra notes 20-22, 24 and accompanying text.
116 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 228 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185,
188 (7th Cir. 1985); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th
Cir. 1982). The view that the antitrust laws should protect the freedom of individual
businesses, which was in vogue in the activist antitrust era of the 1960s and early 1970s,
is currently out of favor with the courts. For earlier cases stating that antitrust policy
should be based on broad social goals, see United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972) (emphasizing freedom of small business to compete); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (pointing out the social importance of small,
locally-owned businesses); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (L.
Hand, J.) (referrinig to a preference for a "system of small producers").
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that "interbrand competition is the primary concern of antitrust
law," the Court did not find that intrabrand competition is of no
consequence.1 7  Free competition among distributors benefits
consumers by reducing resale prices and encouraging marketing
innovations and more efficient forms of retailing. Such competi-
tion also stimulates a greater output of services and adds to the
variety and range of choices available to consumers. Because
intrabrand competition is so important to consumers, a distributor
termination should not be tolerated unless it potentially could
cause a countervailing benefit in the interbrand market.
During the last several years, intrabrand competition has not
been highly regarded by the federal courts or by economists, who
have concentrated instead on the benefits of interbrand competi-
tion at the manufacturer level."' However, intrabrand competi-
tion adds significant economic value at the downstream distribu-
tion level, where resellers interface directly with ultimate end-users.
Distributors are more keenly aware of and better able to respond
to consumers' needs and preferences than upstream suppliers.
When they are allowed to compete freely, distributors are likely to
develop innovative means of delivering services desired by con-
sumers. Such innovations have included "the department store; the
supermarket; the mail order firm; [and] the boutique. " 119
Competition at the resale level can reduce consumer prices
and increase customer services even more effectively than
interbrand competition at the supplier level. 20 There is a strong
impetus toward efficiency in intrabrand markets because of the
many different ways in which resale costs can be reduced. Auto-
mated purchasing and warehousing, minimization of space and in-
117 As the Cernuto court stated: "[I]nterbrand competition . . . has been labelled the
.primary concern of antitrust law' . . . . Nonetheless, intrabrand competition . . . has not
been of so little importance as never to merit the protection of a per se rule." Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977). Justice Stevens stated in his
dissent in Sharp that'"fostering intrabrand competition has been recognized as an impor-
tant goal of antitrust law." Sharp, 485 U.S. at 749 n.14.
118 Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUsT BULL-
155, 177 (1991).
119 Department of Justice Antitrust Division: Oversight Hearings Before Subcomm on Monopo-
lies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judidary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 75
(1986). One of the most recent retail innovations has been the warehouse-type "super
store" that provides one-stop shopping for a variety of items at discount prices. See
Isadore Barmash, Down the Scale With the Major Store Chains, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1992, at
F5.
120 Steiner, supra note 118, at 177.
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ventory, management of receivables and payables, training and
selection of employees, control of rental, utility, and other over-
head expenses, and even the setting of store hours-all of these
factors affect distributors' relative efficiency. The most efficient
dealers will be able to gain a significant cost advantage over their
rivals. As a result, they will be able either to offer substantial dis-
counts or to afford greater point-of-sale services than their compet-
itors. In response to competition from the most efficient dealers,
other distributors will be forced to lower their prices or to in-
crease their level of customer services.
It has become fashionable in recent years to apply the pejora-
tive "free-rider" label to discounters. Discount retailers, however,
are among the most innovative and efficient deliverers of products
to consumers. Their cost-saving methods allow them to provide the
lowest possible retail prices. Consumers have come to rely increas-
ingly in recent years on low-price retailers. Outlet malls,
superstores, mail order firms, warehouse clubs, and other discount
dealers have captured an ever greater portion of the retail market.
As a consumer advocate has pointed out, "during [the] current
recessionary period, [discounters] are not just an option but are a
salvation, offering a way to buy goods that many consumers could
not afford at [the] suggested retail price."121 Indeed, one eco-
nomic study has indicated that consumers pay as much as thirty
percent less in discount stores than at full-price competing out-
lets.122
In certain cases, intrabrand discounting can even reduce pric-
es in the interbrand market. When discounting of one brand is
prevalent, distributors of other brands may exert pressure on their
suppliers to lower wholesale prices so that they can remain com-
petitive with the discount brand. This phenomenon occurred in
the jeans industry after Levi Strauss eliminated resale price restric-
tions on its distributors. Levi Strauss abandoned the restrictions in
121 Vertical Price Fixing. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade
Activities Affecting Small Business of House Comm. on Small Business, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 48
(1983) (statement of Barbara F. Warden, Executive Director, National Consumers'
League). It has been estimated that "discounters now account for more than 40 percent
of general merchandise business and one-third of apparel sales." Robert D. Hershey, Jr.,
Tales of the Tightisted Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1992, at 31. Even upscale consumers
are now seeking out discount outlets for the bargain purchase of luxury products such as
BMWs, 'Wes Saint Laurent lipstick, and Calvin Klein perfumes. See Gretchen Morgenson,
Save $35 on Chane, FoRBEs, March 16, 1992, at 70.
122 Doherty, supra note 29, at 989 n. 210.
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1977 because of an impending enforcement action by the Federal
Trade Commission. 23 Soon thereafter, a number of discount
outlets reduced their prices on Levis. These price cuts triggered
reductions in the prices of competing brands of jeans. 124 Similar-
ly, after Sealy eliminated its exclusive territories and resale price
restrictions for distributors of its mattresses, the prices paid by
consumers for Sealy mattresses fell by as much as twenty to thirty
percent. In response, competing mattress manufacturers were
forced to reduce their prices. 125
The anticompetitive effect of a distributor termination is thus
particularly acute when the terminated distributor is a discounter.
Price-cutting distributors provide an important price alternative to
consumers and a strong impetus to the efficiency of competing
distributors. However, the termination of a full-price distributor
can also have a significant adverse effect on intrabrand competi-
tion. Distributors often elect to compete on the basis of service as
well as price.12 1 Consumers may be willing to pay a higher price
to distributors that provide effective product explanations, demon-
strations, repairs, and other point-of-sale services. Indeed, warranty
repairs of VCRs and other home electronics equipment account
for more than half of many dealers' business today.'27 Distribu-
tors who can provide such point-of-sale services while maintaining
market prices may be just as efficient competitors as discounters.
The termination of such a service-oriented dealer reduces
consumers' choices and can represent as great a loss to intrabrand
competition as the termination of a discounter.
Consumer welfare is thus harmed whenever a distributor is
terminated. If the terminated distributor is a discounter, resale
prices are likely to rise because incumbent distributors have less
incentive to match the efficiencies of a low-cost retailer. If the
123 Steiner, supra note 118, at 187.
124 Gerla, supra note 44, at 6-7.
125 Steiner, supra note 118, at 187. One commentator recently described how
intrabrand competition can reduce interbrand prices: "the retailers look to the manufac-
turers to provide them with the margin dollars that consumers won't." Bill Saporito, Why
the Price Wars Never End, FORTUNE, Mar. 23, 1992, at 68, 70.
126 Indeed, "price" has been defined in economic terms as "a shorthand for a value
that includes a product and associated service." Betty Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical
Restraints, 30 ANTITRUsT BULL 117-23 (1985); see also M. Laurence Popofsky & Stephen V.
Bomse, From Sylvania to Monsanto: No longer a "Free Ride," 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 67, 88
(1985).
127 David J. Jefferson, Service Dealers Complain About Warranty Business: Suit Against Big
Electronics Concerns Cites Unprofitable Repair WorA WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1992, at B2.
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terminated distributor provided a high level of services, the re-
maining distributors will not be as compelled to develop innova-
tive methods of customer assistance. In either case the consumer
will suffer. The only beneficiary of the termination will be the
inducing distributor, who will be free to set its own level of prices
and services without fear of competition from its former rival.
B. The Economic Distinction Between "Horizontal"
and "Vertical" Terminations
Intrabrand competition is reduced regardless of whether a
termination is initiated by a supplier or competing distributor. The
overall competitive effect of the termination, however, varies
greatly depending on the source of the termination. Manufactur-
ers and competing distributors have entirely different competitive
purposes for another distributor's termination. The origin of a
distributor's termination reveals whether there is any offsetting
competitive benefit which compensates for the reduction of
intrabrand competition that inevitably follows the termination.
1. "Vertical" Terminations
When a manufacturer acts independently to restrict
intrabrand competition, its goal invariably is to make its products
more competitive against other brands. A manufacturer has a nat-
ural interest in making its products as attractive to consumers as
possible. Because manufacturers ignore consumer preferences at
their own peril, they will be inclined to continue to deal with the
types of dealers favored by consumers. If consumers prefer to buy
through low-priced outlets, a manufacturer will ultimately have to
deal with discounters or suffer a general decline in demand for its
products. 128 If consumers prefer higher service dealers, the man-
ufacturer must respond by encouraging point-of-sale assistance.
A manufacturer benefits by delivering products to the ultimate
end-user at the lowest possible cost. A supplier does not want to
share any greater portion of its profits with its distributors than is
necessary.12 Restraints on intrabrand competition tend to divert
128 For example, since discounters have become so popular with consumers, manu-
facturers of upscale cosmetics (such as Calvin Klein) have been forced to deal with outlet
stores as well as with department stores. Morgenson, stpra note 121, at 70-71.
129 As the Court stated in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1978):
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a larger portion of this margin to distributors by increasing resale
prices. Thus, a manufacturer will restrict intrabrand competition
only when it believes that higher resale prices will allow distribu-
tors to increase services in a way that will make its products more
attractive to consumers. The manufacturer must be careful to
maintain the right mix of resale prices and services desired by
consumers. The manufacturer will be forced to change its policy if
it misreads consumer preferences and restricts intrabrand competi-
tion to such an extent that resale price increases reduce the over-
all demand for its products."' As the Supreme Court recognized
in Sylvania, the manufacturer's desire to insure its competitiveness
in the interbrand market will act as a natural check on its lim-
itation of intrabrand competition."
A natural system of checks and balances thus insures the
beneficial impact of distributor terminations independently effect-
ed by suppliers. A manufacturer can be relied upon to pursue its
own self-interest in minimizing the adverse competitive effect of a
distributor termination. A manufacturer would not proceed on its
own with a termination whose only effect was to reduce intrabrand
competition and increase retail prices. When a manufacturer inde-
pendently decides to terminate a distributor, and thus to reduce
intrabrand competition, it can safely be assumed that it expects, in
return, some offsetting benefit to consumers in the form of in-
creased services.
2. "Horizontal" Terminations
In effecting distributor terminations, suppliers are more likely
to be acting to promote their own interbrand competitiveness than
simply "knuckling under" to the anticompetitive demands of their
distributors. In most termination cases, distributors' complaints
Generally a manufacturer would prefer the lowest retail price possible, once its
price to dealers has been set, because a lower retail price means increased sales
and higher manufacturer revenues . . . a manufacturer is likely to view the dif-
ference between the price at which it sells to its retailers and their price to the
consumer as, its "cost of distribution," which it would prefer to minimize.
Id. at 56 n.24 (citations omitted).
130 See Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, 796 F.2d 1216, 1226-27 (10th Cir.
1986); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per & Comcept: Price Fixing and Market
Diis/on, 75 YALE LJ. 373, 403 (1966); Bums, supra note 75, at 12; David F. Shores, Verti-
cal Price Fixing and the Contract Conundrum. Beyond Monsanto, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 377,
401 (1985).
131 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56.
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simply bring to a supplier's attention deficiencies in another
distributor's performance (such as poor customer service) that give
the supplier adequate cause to proceed with the termination on
its own. A distributor rarely possesses enough market power to
convince its supplier to terminate another distributor that the
supplier would have preferred to retain."2 However, there are
cases in which a supplier, faced with an ultimatum from a dealer,
may choose to proceed with a termination it otherwise would have
foregone. 3 Preferring to keep both dealers, the supplier never-
theless may conclude that "terminating the plaintiff hurts him less
(considering sales lost, transaction costs in finding and perhaps
training a replacement, and any spillover effects upon his relations
with other dealers) than losing the complainer's patronage."134
This may be particularly true when the complaining distributor
purchases a significantly larger volume of products from the sup-
plier than the terminated distributor.
When one distributor induces a-supplier to terminate another
distributor, a different competitive purpose prevails than in the
case of a vertical termination. Unlike a manufacturer, a dealer is
not motivated to enhance interbrand competition but usually is
driven solely by a desire to restrict intrabrand competition as
much as possible in order to protect its profit margins. 3 5 In the
132 The Supreme Court in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485
U.S. 717 (1988), recognized that "[r]etail market power is rare, because of the usual
presence of interbrand competition and other dealers." Id. at 727 n.2 (citing Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 54). Indeed, a manufacturer easily can refuse to participate in a dealer's
termination scheme. Because the dealer usually is dependent on the manufacturer for its
supply and likely has invested substantial resources in promoting the manufacturer's prod-
uct, the dealer has powerful incentives not to follow through on a threat to stop selling
the manufacturer's product. Even if it does so, manufacturers often easily can find substi-
tute distributors at the unconcentrated retail level where entry barriers are low. See Kevin
J. Arquit, Market Power in Vertical Cases, 60 ANTrrrUsr LJ. 921, 927 (1992) ("[C]ollusion is
unlikely to succeed because retailing in many-industries is a highly competitive, low-mar-
gin business, with low barriers to entry.").
133 Such a termination, in fact, occurred in Sharp. See supra notes 91-92 and accom-
panying text.
134 7 PHILuP AREEDA, ANTRUST LAw I 1457a-1457b, at 166-67 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
135 As Professor Areeda has stated:
From the policy viewpoint, it can matter greatly whether manufacturer or dealer
interests are being served. The former is more likely to seek efficient distribu-
tion, which stimulates interbrand competition; the latter is more -likely to seek
excess profits, which dampen intrabrand competition. Accordingly, antitrust policy
can be more hospitable toward manufacturer efforts to control dealer prices,
customers, or territories than toward the efforts of dealers to control their com-
petitors through the manufacturer.
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case of an induced distributor termination, "the harm to
intrabrand competition ... is both immediate and apparent, with
no countervailing stimulation of interbrand competition, the usual
saving grace of a vertical restraint."5 6 In such an event, a distrib-
utor may be terminated not because it failed to provide adequate
customer services, but because it had lower prices, was more effi-
cient, or was more adept than the instigating distributor at sensing
and responding to consumer preferences.
Distributor terminations that originate with competing distrib-
utors amount to naked restraints of trade whose only purpose is to
suppress intrabrand competition. No conceivable efficiency-enhanc-
ing objective exists for an induced termination. If the termination
were necessary to ensure more effective promotion of its products,
the supplier would have terminated the distributor on its own.
The only purpose of an induced termination is to free a distrib-
utor from competing with a more efficient rival. Induced termina-
tions are most similar in effect to the types of horizontal
price-fixing agreements and territorial allocations that the courts
have deemed per se illegal.- 7 Like such horizontal agreements,
induced terminations eliminate a beneficial rivalry that otherwise
would exist between direct competitors. Indeed, terminations in-
duced by competing distributors have more severe anticompetitive
consequences than actions taken under horizontal dealer cartels.
Cartels are difficult to maintain for a long period of time. Cartel
members are likely to attempt to cheat on agreements requiring
them to maintain particular prices or to remain in certain territo-
ries.' After such cheating begins, cartels usually unravel quickly.
Id. at 167; see also Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1963) ("[I]t
is normally the competitor who is being hurt by price-cutting who is likely to seek coer-
cive action against the competitor who is hurting or likely to hurt him."); Arnold Ponti-
ac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 700 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("A hor-
izontal agreement by dealers ... is only motivated by the dealers [sic] desire to elimi-
nate intrabrand competition within the region and thereby to maximize profits. Such
agreements have no procompetitive motivation, and are consistently found illegal per
se.") (citing Piraino, supra note 11, at 298).
136 Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 141 (2d Cir.) (en banc)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
137 Ser, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (horizontal
price-fixing by beer wholesalers); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972) (territorial allocation by grocery stores selling -Topco" brand).
138 In Sharp, the Supreme Court stated: "Cartels are neither easy to form nor easy to
maintain. Uncertainty over the terms of the cartel, particularly the prices to be charged
in the future, obstructs both formation and adherence by making cheating easier." Busi-
ness Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727 (1985) (citing Matsushita Elec.
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Distributor terminations, however, eliminate intrabrand competi-
tion irrevocably. Once a distributor induces a manufacturer to
terminate a rival, the distributor need not fear competition from
that rival ever again.
The manufacturer's participation gives a mixed termination
conspiracy the ability to effectively foreclose intrabrand competi-
tion. The adverse competitive effect results from a distributor's
ability to enlist the supplier's participation in the conspiracy, not
from the number of distributors who originate the scheme. 9
The number of distributors that induce the termination is without
competitive significance. A termination induced by a single distrib-
utor can adversely affect intrabrand competition to the same ex-
tent as a termination induced by a group of distributors. Indeed, a
single large distributor may have a greater ability to compel the
supplier's participation than a group of smaller distributors.
Any approach to mixed terminations, then, should recognize
certain economic facts: that intrabrand competition should be
protected because it benefits consumers by reducing resale prices
and increasing customer services; that any distributor termination
adversely affects intrabrand competition; that when suppliers inde-
pendently effect terminations, the beneficial impact on interbrand
competition justifies the adverse effect on intrabrand competition;
and that, in those rare cases where one or more distributors in-
duce their supplier to terminate another distributor, there is no
such beneficial effect on interbrand competition, but only harm to
consumers from increased resale prices and reduced point-of-sale
services.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588 (1925)).
139 The Supreme Court recognized in cases such as Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), and United States v. General Motors, Corp., 384 U.S.
127 (1966), that the competitive evil of a group boycott stems from the elimination of a
competitor from the intrabrand market at the instigation of a rival and not from a
broad horizontal conspiracy. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
One commentator has pointed out that "[a] dealer's success in using the refusal-to-
deal weapon to strike at a competitor depends on enlisting the cooperation of their
mutual supplier, not other competing dealers." Comment, Vertical Agreement as Horizontal
RestrainL. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 128 U. PA L. REv. 622, 641-42 (1980).
19921
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
VI. A SUGGESTED ANTITRUST ANALYSIS FOR MIXED TERMINATIONS
A. The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy
The economic consequences of distributor terminations thus
depend upon whether the termination was effected vertically by a
supplier or induced horizontally by one or more competing dis-
tributors. In order to recognize these economic effects, the courts
should adopt a horizontal/vertical analysis of mixed terminations
in place of the current price/nonprice dichotomy.1 40
Under a horizontal/vertical dichotomy, the courts would no
longer have to distinguish arbitrarily between "price" and
"nonprice" restraints. If a manufacturer acted independently to
terminate a distributor, the court would uphold the termination
regardless of whether the distributor was a price cutter. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Monsanto and Sharp, a manufacturer
may have legitimate reasons for terminating a discounter.14 1
When a termination is effected independently, its only conceivable
purpose can be to make the supplier a more effective competitor.
If a manufacturer prefers to deal through higher-priced distribu-
tors who provide greater customer services, it should have that
prerogative. The manufacturer should not be deterred from imple-
menting a high service distribution policy by fear that a dis-
140 Some courts have recognized the utility of the horizontal/vertical distinction in
mixed termination cases. Se, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d
1190, 1197 (6th Cir. 1982) ("A determination of the source of the restraints im-
posed . . . will expose the purpose of such restraints."); Id. at 1197 n.10 ("A restraint
imposed by distributors is generally for the purpose of restricting supply or price compe-
tition . . .whereas restraints imposed intrabrand by a manufacturer may be imposed for
the purpose of competing more effectively in the interbrand market") (citations omit-
ted); see also Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) [
69,918 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1992); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d
802, 805-06 (6th Cir. 1988); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1497 (3d
Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S. 1105 (1986); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981);
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979); Lovett v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Minn. 1991); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 700 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
Professor Turner has concluded that "the economic consequences of a vertical-hori-
zontal arrangement may well vary substantially depending on where the initiative came
from and . . . legal conclusions should not be made without taking this into account."
Turner, supra note 66, at 699; see also AREEDA, supra note 134, 1 1457, at 167-68;
SULLVAN, supra note 50, at § 148; Erwin A. Elias, Dealer Termination or Exclusion,
Intrabrand Competition and GTE Sylvania, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 473 (1977); Piraino,
supra note 11; Steuer, supra note 4, at 523.
141 See supra notes 67-70, 94 and accompanying text.
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counter's termination will be deemed illegal. Indeed, an approach
limiting a manufacturer's right to choose the types of distributors
with which it prefers to deal could ultimately eliminate intrabrand
competition by encouraging suppliers to vertically integrate14
On the other hand, a termination induced by competing
distributors should be illegal regardless of whether the supplier
and distributors had a specific price-related motive. When one or
more distributors convince a supplier to terminate a competitor
that otherwise would have remained in the intrabrand market,
consumer prices and services are adversely affected. The adverse
effect is not dependent upon the remaining distributors' agree-
ment to sell the manufacturer's product at a specific price. Nor
does it depend upon the terminated distributor being a discount-
er. The induced termination of a full-price dealer can be just as
anticompetitive as the coerced termination of a discounter. 43
Since induced terminations clearly are anticompetitive, a court
need not determine whether the inducing distributor was motivat-
ed by the terminated distributor's low prices- or by some other
142 See Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1006-07
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Almarin Phillips & Joseph Mahoney, Unreason-
able Rules and Rules of Reason: Economic Aspects of Vertical Price-Fixing, 30 ANTrrRUsT BuLti
99, 102 (1985). In applying the rule of reason to nonprice vertical restraints, the court
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), cited "the incentive
for vertical integration" that would be fostered by a per se approach. Id. at 57 n.26. Ver-
tical integration of newspaper publishing and distribution was, in fact, the consequence
of the Court's application of the per se rule to maximum resale price maintenance in
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See David H. Marks & Jonathan M. Jacob-
son, Price-Fixing: An Overview, 30 ANTITRUST BULL 199, 254 (1985).
143 Courts have consistently held that the horizontal exclusion of a firm from a par-
ticular market should be per se illegal regardless of whether price-fixing was a motive for
the exclusion. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Cadillac Over-
all Supply, 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961). In United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1965), the Court stated, "Nor do we propose to construe
the Sherman Act to prohibit conspiracies to fix prices at which competitors may sell, but
to allow conspiracies or combinations to put competitors out of business entirely." Id. at
148.
Several commentators have concluded that horizontal market division is as great an
evil as horizontal price-fixing. Se, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis
of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1978); Peter J. Monte, Com-
ment, Restricted Distribution After "Schwinn," 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L REV. 1032, 1040-41
(1968); Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 92 HARV. L. REV. 1160, 1163 (1979). In fact. horizontal territorial allo-
cations arguably have a greater anticompetitive effect than horizontal price-fixing.
Price-fixing eliminates only price competition among competitors, but horizontal market
division eliminates all competition.
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aspect of its competition. The need to deter such anticompetitive
conduct justifies deeming it illegal on its face. 44
B. Distinguishing Horizontal from Vertical Conduct
Many courts and commentators have recognized the logic of
the horizontal/vertical dichotomy.145 They have concluded, how-
ever, that the distinction has little practical utility because it is
difficult to determine whether a supplier's or distributor's purpose
prevailed in a particular case. 4 ' Nevertheless, in contrast to the
price/nonprice dichotomy, the distinction between horizontal and
144 In a special circumstance, a dealer's inducement of a termination need not be
illegal. The courts have recognized that the "termination of one dealer in order to grant
another exclusive distribution rights in an area is generally lawful." Business Elecs. Corp.
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 746 n.11 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
AREFDA, supra note 134, 1 1457, at 174-75). In applying the per se rule in Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1958), the Court noted that it was not faced
with "a case of.. . a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributor-
ship." Id. at 212. Several courts have agreed that "a company may contract with a new
distributor and as a consequence terminate its relationship with a former distributor with-
out running afoul of the Sherman Act, even if the effect of the new contract is to seri-
ously damage the former distributor's business." Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters.,
774 F.2d 380, 386-87 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Dart Indus. v. Plunkett Co. of Okla., 704
F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983); Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245, 1249
(5th Cir. 1975)); see also Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1110 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d
126, 131-34 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Packard Motor Car Co.
v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 355 U.S. 822
(1957). But see Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.
1983) (per se rule deemed applicable when domestic distributor of valves induced foreign
manufacturer to terminate plaintiff as exclusive distributor and award distributorship to
itself).
The exclusive distributorship rule is justified by the fact that, when one exclusive
distributor is substituted for another, even as a result of horizontal inducement from the
new distributor, there is no net reduction of intrabrand competition. It is also unlikely
that the new dealer would have had sufficient market power to induce the manufacturer
to effect the termination of an incumbent dealer it otherwise would have retained.
145 See supra note 140.
146 See, e.g., Valley liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 744 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Judge Posner noted that there was a "certain unreality" in distinguishing be-
tween the possible motivations for a dealer termination.). One commentator has stated
that "an approach that attempts to determine which party's interest or initiative is more
fully served by the agreement encounters difficulties; for the most significant interests of
the manufacturer are themselves framed in terms of the interests of the dealer." Note,
Restrictive Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 64 HARV. L. REV. 671, 683-84
(1966); see also Joseph P. Bauer, Per S Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deak A Rule Ripe for
Re-examination, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 685, 712 (1979); Buxbaum, supra note 50, at 68384;
BJ. Douek, Comment, A Proposed Rule of Reason Analysis for Restrictions on Distribution, 47
FORDHAM L. REv. 527, 566 (1979).
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vertical conduct has a rational economic basis. Therefore, the
courts should be able to easily make this distinction.
The courts could simplify their task of distinguishing between
horizontal and vertical conduct by separating the issue of the
cause of a termination from the issue of conspiracy. Too often in
mixed termination cases, the courts have confused these two issues
by assuming that antitrust liability must attomatically follow once a
conspiracy is found. Determining the existence of an agreement,
however, should be only the first step in the antitrust analysis. An
offense under section 1 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
a contract, combination, or conspiracy and (2) an unreasonable
restraint of trade.'4 7 The second element is much more impor-
tant. As one judge has pointed out, courts' "mechanistic search for
direct evidence of a combination diverts consideration away from
the more significant issue, which is the appropriate treatment of
such conduct under the antitrust laws."1
4
Under Monsanto, a supplier and complaining distributor could
be deemed to have a "conscious commitment to a common
scheme," and thus to have conspired, if they share a desire that
another distributor be terminated. 141 Such a shared commitment,
however, reveals nothing about the competitive purpose or effect
of the termination. The supplier and distributor may each have
been committed to the termination for entirely different reasons.
The supplier may have effected the termination to enforce a poli-
cy requiring customer services at the resale level, while the distrib-
utor may have attempted to induce the termination simply to
avoid competition from a more efficient rival. Thus, a manufactur-
er should not be found liable simply for "agreeing" to effect a
termination. In addition to determining the presence of a conspir-
acy, a court should consider whether the conspiracy with the in-
ducing distributor caused the termination. If a supplier would
have proceeded with a termination in any event, the conspiracy
could not be the cause of the termination, and the supplier and
complaining distributor should not be liable under the federal
antitrust laws.
150
147 See Bums, supra note 75, at 3.
148 Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 131 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
149 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1983).
150 Section 4 of the Clayton Act requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that it has
been "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). Courts have construed this language to require
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By separating the issue of the cause of a termination from the
question of whether the parties have entered into a formal anti-
trust conspiracy, the courts can concentrate on the most important
issue: which party's purposes were served by effecting the termina-
tion? The ultimate competitive result of the termination depends
upon whether the distributor was terminated to effect the
supplier's beneficial purposes or a distributor's anticompetitive
intentions. A manufacturer should not be liable if it would have
effected a distributor termination for its own reasons even in the
absence of complaints from other distributors. The complaints may
merely inform a manufacturer of violations of its distribution poli-
cy that justify the termination. A court should hold the manufac-
turer liable only when it had no purpose for a termination inde-
pendent of its distributors' anticompetitive desires. Thus, a court
should require the terminated distributor to prove that a compet-
ing distributor's complaints were the proximate cause of its termi-
nation; that is, but for the inducement of the competitor, the
manufacturer would not have proceeded with the termination.
C. Elements of the Causation Standard
The "but for" causation standard would not permit liability if
a distributor's complaint were simply one link in a chain of events
that led to a termination.1 51 A court could not find a causal con-
nection between the complaints and the termination "merely be-
cause one follows the other."52 The terminated distributor
would have to prove that another distributor's complaints were the
determinative factor in its termination. In making the but for
analysis, a court should assume "that that factor was present at the
a causal nexus between the plaintiff's injury and the prohibited antitrust conduct. See,
e.g., Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 901 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973). Thus, there can be no antitrust liability in the absence of
"some causal connection between the alleged conspiracy and the refusal to deal."
Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 721 (S.D.N.Y.), affld, 417 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1969); see also Burns, supra note 75, at 3.
In Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,918 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1992), the court stated that "an antitrust plaintiff must be
prepared to demonstrate a causal relationship between alleged dealer complaints and
a . .. [supplier's] action in order to show that the concerted action in violation of the
Sherman Act is distinguishable from 'perfectly legitimate' independent conduct." Id. at
68,392 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64).
151 Contrast the Price Fixing Prevention Act currently pending in Congress, under
which liability would arise if a complaint was a "major cause" of a termination. See SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.
152 EdwardJ Sweeney & Sons, 637 F.2d at 116.
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time of the event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had
been absent, the event nevertheless would have transpired in the
same way." 5 ' The test thus forces a court to consider how a
manufacturer would have acted in the absence of the complaints.
If a supplier would have terminated the distributor had it learned
of its conduct from a source other than the complaining distribu-
tor, the complaint would not be deemed the proximate cause of
the termination. In such a case, the net effect on competition
would be no different than if the supplier and complaining dis-
tributor had never entered into an agreement.
The but for test would be a rigorous hurdle for plaintiffs. It
would thus resolve the Supreme Court's concern in Monsanto and
Sharp that fear of antitrust liability deters suppliers from taking
legitimate actions to encourage point-of-sale seriices. 54 This high
threshold for proving causation should make manufacturers more
comfortable in proceeding with terminations of distributors who
are failing to provide customer services, even if that failure initially
is brought to their attention by other distributors. Suppliers and
distributors, then, would feel free to communicate legitimate infor-
mation about their effectiveness in meeting consumer
preferences. 155
The courts are well equipped to determine a manufacturer's
purpose for a termination under a separate causal standard.'56
Courts are very familiar with "but for" tests, having used them for
153 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (construing proximate
cause analysis in employment discrimination action).
154 See supra notes 68-71, 94 and accompanying text.
155 Such information can be very important for manufacturers:
Manufacturers rely heavily upon the "middle man," that is distributors and re-
tailers, for information from consumers about their products: are the products
too big? too small? too expensive? to [sic] few? too many?; are they properly
advertised, properly constructed, etc. The distributor and retailer generally have
first-hand experience with consumers and first-hand knowledge of consumer re-
action to a manufacturer's products, information which the manufacturer needs
to keep its product competitive in the market place.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13.
156 Some courts and commentators, however, believe that it is too difficult for courts
to distinguish permissible motives from illegal intent in mixed termination cases. See
Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 594 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers,
Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 1982); Burms, supra note 75, at 35; Peter M. Gerhart,
The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981
DUKE LJ. 417, 439 ("Focusing on subjective motive . . . is risky and ineffectual; not only
can evidence of purpose be manipulated, but the evidence is usually ambiguous.").
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years in proving cause-in-fact in tort actions.17 Triers of fact are
accustomed to determining issues of purpose and motivation.
Indeed, they are more capable of deciding such issues than resolv-
ing the complex economic problems raised in standard rule of
reason cases.'58 The courts traditionally have recognized that
"motive and intent play leading roles"'59 in antitrust cases. As
Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Sharp, "[I]n antitrust, as in
many other areas of the law, motivation matters and factfinders
are able to distinguish bad from good intent.""6 The courts
have deemed purpose to be a particularly important factor in
group boycott cases, where the parties may have different competi-
tive motives for participating in the boycott.1 61
In other legal areas, courts routinely resolve cases involving
mixed motives. For example, under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,162 courts must determine whether employment deci-
sions are based on objective standards or on such discriminatory
bases as race, religion, sex, or national origin. Employeis' deci-
sions on hiring and promotion are often based on a mixture of
legitimate and illegal motives.' Distinguishing which motive pre-
157 Gerla, supra note 44, at 15.
158 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-12 (1972); see also Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). Indeed, most juries
simply are incapable of performing the type of economic analysis required under a full
rule of reason approach. See Bums, supra note 75, at 37-38.
159 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
160 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 754 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-
11 (1985); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case
for Presuming the Legalay of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (1988)).
Prior to Sharp, the Supreme Court appeared to be moving toward an antitrust stan-
dard that emphasized a defendant's purpose in implementing competitive restraints. In
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court stated that a defendant's pur-
pose for a restraint "tends to show [its] effect." Id. at 19. In White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Court referred to the relevance of defendants' motives.
Id. at 256-59. Finally, by emphasizing the redeeming effects of nonprice vertical restraints
in Sylvania, the Court implicitly found purpose to be a critical factor in a Sherman § 1
analysis. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
161 One court has concluded that in all boycott cases "the touchstone of per se ille-
gality has been the purpose and effect of the arrangement in question." E.A. McQuade
Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
162 42 U.S.CA § 2000 e-I to -17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).




dominates in a Title VII case is no more difficult than determin-
ing whether a distributor termination was motivated by a supplier's
independent purposes or by a distributor's anticompetitive desires.
D. Indications of Horizontal or Vertical Cause
Most mixed terminations reveal outward indications of the
parties' purpose. Thus, a court need not read a defendant's mind
to determine the causal issue. In order to provide effective guid-
ance on antitrust compliance, courts should clarify which external
factors will raise an inference that the inducement of another
distributor caused a termination.
For suppliers contemplating a distributor termination, the
primary antitrust issue is whether a jury will consider the
distributor's claim. The mere risk of a jury trial may be enough to
deter a supplier from effecting a termination that could have
made its products more competitive in the interbrand market. In
order to protect suppliers, who most often terminate distributors
for procompetitive reasons,1 courts should not allow an infer-
ence of horizontal causation simply from the timing of distributor
complaints. The termination of a distributor immediately after the
receipt of a price-cutting complaint provides some circumstantial
evidence of horizontal cause."6 Standing alone, however, such
evidence should not raise an inference of horizontal cause. It is
natural and appropriate for a supplier to be concerned about and
to react to complaints from its distributors about another distri-
butor's -competitive activities, but such conduct does not prove
that a supplier had an anticompetitive purpose for a termination.
The plaintiff's case will be more persuasive if it can combine
evidence on the timing of complaints with other indications of
horizontal inducement. The substance of the complaints them-
selves often will indicate the parties' anticompetitive purpose. The
complaints may reveal more than a distributor's simple dissatisfac-
tion with a rival's discountifig. The distributor may expressly re-
quest that the supplier terminate the plaintiff and may threaten to
condition future purchases on the supplier's compliance. The evi-
164 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
165 A supplier also can use the timing of complaints to rebut an inference of hori-
zontal cause. In Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.
1980), cart. denieA 451 U.S. 911 (1981), for example, the court failed to find liability
where the complaints had commenced a full five years before a supplier took any action
to terminate a distributor. Id. at 114.
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dence of horizontal cause will be particularly strong when such an
ultimatum is delivered by several distributors or by a single distrib-
utor who purchases a greater volume of products from the suppli-
er than the plaintiff. 6 Such evidence should be sufficient to
raise an inference that, but for the ultimatum, the supplier would
not have terminated the plaintiff.67
Even when the plaintiff has introduced such evidence, a sup-
plier should have an opportunity to rebut the inference of hori-
zontal cause by demonstrating that it had its own reasons for ac-
ceding to the threats of a distributor. A supplier should prevail on
summary judgment if it can show that it terminated the plaintiff
for violating a valid pre-existing distribution policy. The supplier,
for example, may have had an express policy requiring distributors
to provide certain customer services, or the supplier may have
sought to ensure such services by precluding distributors from
competing against each other for particular customers or in cer-
tain territories. A manufacturer should not be liable for terminat-
ing a distributor which fails to observe such pre-existing policies,
even if the termination occurs after a threat from another distrib-
utor. Although the distributor may have anticompetitive reasons
for the threat, the manufacturer may feel compelled to effect the
termination to ensure the continued viability of its distribution
policy."6 In such a case, a terminated distributor could not meet
its burden of showing that a rival's threat was the sole activating
cause of its termination. Thus, if a manufacturer can prove that it
had implemented territorial or customer restrictions in order to
prevent free-riding, an ultimatum from the distributors requiring
the manufacturer to enforce such restrictions should not give rise
to antitrust liability.
169
166 It was an ultimatum from the larger of two competing dealers that caused the
termination in Sharp. See supra notes 91, 92, 104 and accompanying text. In Big Apple
BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,918 (3d Cir.
Aug. 6, 1992), there was evidence that several dealers had been able to convince the
supplier to deny the grant of an automobile dealership to a potential competitor. Id. at
68,939-40.
167 In Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Belk Bros., 621 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), for example, a supplier was found liable for terminating a discounter after its
largest distributor threatened to discontinue further purchases. Id. at 233.
168 For example, in O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.
1986), Apple Computer had banned mall order sales of its computers after several of its
dealers had complained of price competition from such outlets. In upholding Apple's
conduct, the court relied on Apple's pre-existing marketing strategy to deal only with
those distributors that could provide customer services. Id. at 1468.
169 When a manufacturer has implemented vertical territorial or customer restrictions
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The manufacturer's evidence, however, must show that it
introduced a restrictive distribution policy prior to the complaints
and that it terminated the plaintiff in a legitimate effort to en-
force such a policy. General after-the-fact statements about the
manufacturer's concern for free-riding should not suffice.' 70 The
history of the supplier's relationship with the plaintiff and other
distributors may reveal whether in fact the supplier did have a real
policy prior to the time of the complaints. The supplier, for exam-
ple, may have previously warned the plaintiff about violations of its
distribution policy or taken actions against other distributors which
committed such violations. If, on the other hand, the supplier
never discussed the policy with the plaintiff prior to the termina-
tion or allowed other distributors to violate the policy with impu-
nity, a court may be less willing to accept the supplier's argument
that it acted independently.
17 1
E. Elements of the Conspiracy Standard
Under the but for standard, a terminated distributor will not
be able to reach a jury without substantial evidence that its suppli-
er was motivated only by the anticompetitive concerns of a rival
to prevent free-riding, its enforcement of such restrictions following distributors' com-
plaints does not limit intrabrand competition any more than it was already limited under
the vertical restraints. See Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1439 (7th Cir.
1986); McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323, 329-30 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denie.d 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Landmark Dev. Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752
F.2d 369, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1985); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, -686 F.2d
1190, 1200-01 (6th Cir. 1982); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d
742, 744 (7th Cir. 1982).
170 In Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982), the court held
the manufacturer liable because the manufacturer could not show an independent reason
for terminating its distributor for territorial incursions into another distributor's territory.
Id. at 410-11. The court relied on the fact that the manufacturer had not previously in-
plemented a program of restricted distribution. Id. Similarly, the majority in Sharp should
have recognized that there was no indication that Sharp terminated the plaintiff in order
to enforce its pre-existing distribution policies, rather than to simply placate a competing
distributor. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 741 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 In finding the manufacturer liable in Monsanto, the Court referred to the fact
that "Monsanto never discussed with Spray-Rite prior to the termination the distributor-
ship criteria that were the alleged basis for the action." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 (1983). In Schwimmer v. Sony Corporation of America, 1980-81
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied;
459 U.S. 1007 (1982), a supplier argued that it terminated a distributor for failing to
repay advertising credits rather than because of competitors' complaints. Id. at 78,088.
The court held the supplier liable because it had not previously terminated a distributor
for such conduct. Id.
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distributor. With such a high threshold for proving causation, the
courts would not have to impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs to
show a conspiracy between the supplier and another distributor.
Since a defendant could not be held liable without clear proof of
horizontal cause, courts could feel comfortable inferring the exis-
tence of a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence.
Prior to Monsanto, courts had recognized that direct evidence
of a conspiracy should not be required in an antitrust case be-
cause it is rarely available.172 As one judge pointed out, antitrust
conspiracies "are not usually brought to light by direct evidence or
frank admissions," but often require the fact finder to judge
"acts ... mostly circumstantial in nature, requiring judicious appli-
cation of those inferences which arise from the conduct under
scrutiny."173 In antitrust cases, courts have traditionally deferred
to the fact finder to make the ultimate determination of the infer-
ences to be drawn from ambiguous evidence.174 Thus, in several
cases, the Supreme Court has been willing to infer the existence
of a conspiracy from ambivalent conduct.175
Monsanto does not compel courts to adopt a higher hurdle for
proof of conspiracy in mixed termination cases. Indeed, contrary
to the opinion of most lower federal courts, 176 Monsanto should
not preclude the federal judiciary from inferring a conspiracy
from circumstantial evidence. The facts of Monsanto, as opposed to
the Court's rhetoric, support such an approach. 177 By engaging
172 See McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986),
cetM. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 763
F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985); Bostick Oil Co., Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983).
173 Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 861 (1st Cir. 1982) (Torruella,
J., dissenting); see also Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 568 F. Supp. 205,
210 (E.D.N.C. 1983), affd, 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985). In McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v.
La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323, 328 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988),
the court concluded that simply because "the evidence of concerted action is primarily
circumstantial does not undermine this conclusion: conspiracies are rarely evidenced by
explicit agreements, and therefore may be proved by circumstantial evidence and the rea-
sonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Id. at 328.
174 See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). The fact finder plays a
particularly important role in dealer termination cases, where purpose is so critical and
the "evidence will often reflect what counsel advise businessmen their purpose should
have been." Pitofsky, supra note 143, at 35.
175 See United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939).
176 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. Even Senator Metzenbaum, the
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in a separate causal analysis as proposed in this Article, the courts
can meet Monsanto's requirement for proof of "something more"
than evidence of. complaints in mixed termination cases. 178 The
"something more" will consist of a plaintiffs proof, under the but
for test, that a supplier was acceding to a distributor's
anticompetitive desires in .effecting a termination.
In the recent case of Eastman Kodak,' 9 the Supreme Court
exploded the notion held by many commentators and lower fed-
eral courts since Monsanto' that antitrust plaintiffs must meet a
higher threshold of proof in order to survive a summary judgment
motion. The Court specifically stated that its prior precedent "did
not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judg-
ment in antitrust cases."' According to the Court, the plaintiff,
need not disprove any arguments advanced by the defendant, but
simply must present evidence from which "reasonable inferences"
supporting its claims can be drawn. 2
The federal courts, therefore, should be willing to infer an
illegal conspiracy when the circumstances surrounding a distribu-
tor termination reveal a reasonable possibility that, as required by
Monsanto, the parties had a "conscious commitment to a common
scheme."' Obviously, the manufacturer's commitment to the
scheme is indicated by its proceeding with the termination. A
sponsor of the Consumer Protection Against Price-Fixing Act of 1991, S. 429, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991), in the Senate, concedes that the problem with Monsanto lies not with
the Court's holding, but with the lower federal courts' interpretation of its conspiracy
standard. See 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 652 (May 9, 1991). In
fact, in the post-Monsanto era, some lower federal courts have been willing to find an
illegal agreement even in the absence of direct evidence of a conspiracy. See supra cases
cited in note 90. In the recent case of ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc.,
939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1176 (1992), the court inferred a
conspiracy from the parallel action of several automobile dealers who complained in
concert to manufacturers about the planned location of additional dealerships at a near-
by "automobile mall." Id. at 554. The court stated that "it is axiomatic that the typical
conspiracy is rarely evidenced by explicit agreements, but must almost always be proved
by inferences that may be drawn from the behavior of the alleged conspirators." Id at
553 (quotations omitted).
178 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
179 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
180 Seve supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
181 Eastman Kodak 112 S. Ct. at 2083.
182 Id. The Court's decision in Eastman Kodak has already been used in the Court of
Appeals as authority for allowing a terminated dealer to survive a supplier's motion for
summary judgment. Sea Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 69,918, at 68,391 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1992).
183 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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court, therefore, should limit its inquiry to whether the complain-
ing dealers shared the desire that the plaintiff be terminated. An
outright demand for termination would be proof of the dealers'
intent to join the manufacturer in the termination scheme. Proof
of the dealers' commitment may also arise from more circum-
stantial evidence. For example, frequent complaints or meetings
between the manufacturer and dealers immediately prior to the
termination may indicate that the dealers intended that a rival be
terminated.
F. Fairness of the Proposed Standard
The standard for distinguishing horizontal from vertical con-
duct proposed in this Article is fair to both suppliers and distribu-
tors. Since the plaintiff has a high threshold of proof under the
but for standard, suppliers will not be liable when they indepen-
dently effect terminations designed to maintain the integrity of
their distribution systems. With a renewed emphasis by the courts
on purpose and motive, suppliers will be able to protect them-
selves from the costs and risks of a jury trial by documenting, in
advance, their beneficial vertical intent for particular terminations.
Terminated distributors also will be better served by the
courts' emphasis on the substantive competitive purpose for termi-
nations. Plaintiffs' claims will no longer be subject to dismissal on
grounds divorced from the economic effects of the terminations.
Freed of the price/nonprice dichotomy, a terminated distributor
will not have to prove a direct effect on resale prices, but simply
that a competitor induced its termination. Plaintiffs' claims will
not be barred from consideration at trial when direct evidence of
a conspiracy between a supplier and complaining distributors is-
lacking. Finally, since an inducing distributor as well as the suppli-
er will be liable when the but for test is met, distributors will be
assured that their rivals will be deterred from originating
anticompetitive termination schemes.
VII. RECONCILING THE NEW APPROACH WITH
RECENT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The causal analysis proposed in this Article is an effective
means of distinguishing procompetitive vertical terminations from
anticompetitive horizontal ones. The question remains, however,
whether the lower federal courts are free to adopt such an analysis
under recent Supreme Court precedent. There are two impedi-
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ments to the adoption of the approach proposed in this Article:
the price/nonprice dichotomy that resulted from the Sylvania
decision and Sharp' severe limitation on the per se analysis in
mixed termination cases.
18 4
A. An "Andllay Restraints" Approach
A form of antitrust analysis adopted long before the Sharp or
Sylvania decisions provides a method by which the lower federal
courts can utilize the horizontal/vertical distinction in place of the
price/nonprice dichotomy. In 1898, Judge Taft first set forth the
"ancillary restraints" doctrine in United States v. Addyston Pipe and
Steel Co. 185 In that case, Judge Taft held that a restraint of trade
should be permissible when it was "ancillary to the main purpose
of a [lawful] contract [and] was reasonably adapted and limited to
the necessary protection of a party in the carrying out of such
purpose .... "186 This approach provides a simple and effective
means of distinguishing between permissible and illegal restrictions
on competition. Under Judge Taft's analysis, restrictions necessary
to promote a procompetitive objective would be allowed; however,
"naked" restraints of trade unrelated to any legitimate competitive
purpose would be void.
Until recently, courts largely neglected the ancillary restraints
doctrine. However, the federal courts have revived this approach
during the last decade. In several recent cases, the lower federal
courts used the ancillary restraints doctrine to uphold horizontal
competitive restrictions rather than subject them to the per se
rule. The courts concluded that the restrictions were necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of cooperative arrangements designed to
promote, rather than to restrict, competition.
7
184 See supra notes 25-35, 93-99 and accompanying text.
185 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
186 Id. at 283.
187 See National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601-02 (11th Cir.)
(denying application of per se rule to interchange fee among members of VISA credit
card system because fee was "'necessary' term without which the system would not func-
tion"), ce. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding horizontal restraints among agents of
van line designed to avoid free riding), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros. v.
Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying rule of reason to
noncompetition covenant between competing dealers that was designed to eliminate free
riding).
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet expressly adopted
the ancillary restraints doctrine, it has implicitly followed the ap-
proach on a few occasions. In those cases, the Court declined to
use the per se rule when horizontal agreements were implemented
in connection with legitimate cooperative endeavors. For example,
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, s members of a musical compos-
ers association had agreed on a common price for the licensing of
their musical compositions. If the Court had followed its tradition-
al approach to price-related restraints, it would have found this
arrangement illegal on its face."8 9 Indeed, the Court conceded
that the scheme constituted price-fixing "in the literal sense."190
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the arrangement because it was
critical to the achievement of the composers' procompetitive pur-
pose: the effective marketing of their musical compositions.1 9' In
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing
Co., 92 the plaintiff argued that its expulsion from a purchasing
cooperative of office supply stores constituted a per se illegal
group boycott. The Court, however, refused to apply its traditional
per se approach, pointing out that the cooperative promoted pur-
chasing efficiencies for the stores and, without reasonable mem-
bership rules, could not operate effectively.'93
Broadcast Music and Northwest Wholesale indicate that the Court
may be willing to use an ancillary restraints analysis to uphold
restrictions that are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of coop-
erative ventures that have a procompetitive purpose. Under the
Court's standard approach, the price-fixing in Broadcast Music and
the group boycott in Northwest Wholesale would have been found il-
legal on their face. However, in each case, the Court looked be-
yond the outward form of the arrangement and considered the
parties' competitive intent. The Court upheld the restraints at
issue because they were essential to the operation of partnerships
designed to promote, rather than to restrict, competition. In
Broadcast Music, the composers had formed a joint venture that
188 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
189 Horizontal price-fixing had traditionally been considered by the Court to be the
most firmly established of all per se illegal conduct. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Profession-
al Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); United States v. Container Corp. of
Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
224 (1940); Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 601-05 (1936).
190 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8.
191 Id at 21, 24.
192 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
193 Id. at 295, 298.
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made their compositions more readily available to the public, 94
and, in Northwest Wholesale, the stationery stores created a coopera-
tive that allowed smaller retailers to compete more effectively. 19
The ancillary restraints analysis, implicitly adopted by the
Court in Broadcast Music and Northwest Wholesale, provides a basis
for upholding all vertical terminations. Like the license agreements
in Broadcast Music and the membership rules in Northwest Wholesale,
vertical terminations effected independently by suppliers are ancil-
lary to a procompetitive cooperative arrangement; that is, the
partnership between a supplier and its distribution network to
promote interbrand competition. 196 In an economic sense, a sup-
plier is engaged in a joint venture with its distributors to deliver
products to consumers in the most efficient manner possible. As
long as a supplier makes a termination decision in order to pro-
mote the effectiveness of its distribution system, it should not mat-
ter whether the termination was motivated by "price" or
"nonprice" concerns. The termination should be upheld in any
event because it is ancillary to the supplier's legitimate desire to
increase its effectiveness in the interbrand market.
197
An ancillary restraints analysis also requires that terminations
induced by one or more competing distributors be deemed illegal.
Induced terminations are unrelated to any legitimate competitive
purpose. Unlike the parties to the cooperative arrangements at
issue in Broadcast Music and Northwest Wholesale,198 distributors of
a particular brand are not engaged in a procompetitive partner-
ship with each other. The partnership designed to promote
interbrand competition is vertically directed by the supplier, not
horizontally imposed by distributors. Distributors are not motivated
by an intent to further competition with other brands, but by a
194 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
195 Northwest Wholeal 472 U.S. at 295.
196 Some commentators have compared this relationship to a partnership. See Bork,
supra note 130, at 404; Liebeler, supra note 36, at 906 n.80.
197 In fact, some courts have used the ancillary restraints doctrine to uphold resale
price restrictions implemented by a manufacturer in conjunction with nonprice restraints.
See McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986), cet. de-
nieA 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir.
1986); Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerburg Instruments, 572 F.2d 883
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978). Some commentators have argued that resale
price restraints should be upheld as ancillary to a manufacturer's procompetitive partner-
ship with its distributors. See e.g., BORK, supra note 36, at 29.
198 See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
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desire to increase their individual profits in the intrabrand market.
The surest route to such an increase is by eliminating competition
from a rival. Thus, termination schemes that originate with distrib-
utors are not ancillary to a legitimate procompetitive arrangement,
but are simply naked restraints of trade designed to suppress com-
petition. Under Addyston Pipe, Broadcast Music, and Northwest Whole-
sale, courts should deem distributor-induced terminations illegal on
their face because their only purpose is to restrict competition.
B. A New Rule of Reason Approach for Mixed Terminations
Can an ancillary restraints analysis still be applied to all dis-
tributor terminations after Sharp? In Sharp, the Court required the
terminated distributor to use a rule of reason, rather than a per
se, approach because a single competitor induced its termina-
tion.1" Under a traditional rule of reason analysis, the terminat-
ed distributor has to prove more than an anticompetitive purpose
for its termination; it also faces the nearly impossible task of show-
ing that its termination caused an adverse impact on interbrand
competition.2° A closer reading of Sharp and other recent Su-
preme Court cases, however, reveals that a distributor termination
induced by one or more competitors can be deemed illegal with-
out a market analysis.
In recent years, some federal courts have begun to recognize
that the alternative to the per se rule need not be a traditional
rule of reason market analysis. These courts have used a more
abbreviated rule of reason approach that focuses simply on the
defendant's purpose for implementing a competitive restraint.01
This new standard, rather than the traditional market-based rule
of reason, could be used as the alternative approach mandated by
the Court in Sharp. Under this new standard, no further inquiry
would be necessary once the plaintiff proved that its termination
was in response to the anticompetitive concerns of one of its ri-
vals. Since an induced termination has no redeeming beneficial
effect on interbrand competition, its restriction of intrabrand com-
petition would suffice to prove its illegality.
It is legitimate for courts to give prominent consideration to
intrabrand competition under a new rule of reason standard.
Sylvania and Sharp stated that interbrand competition is the "pri-
199 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 220-43 and accompanying text.
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mary concern" of antitrust law,212 but they did not state that it
was the only concern. Several lower federal court cases decided
after Sylvania have held that restrictions that affect only intrabrand
competition can be found illegal without a market analysis. 20
In Eastman Kodak, the Supreme Court recognized tlat the
suppression of intrabrand competition can be illegal in itself. East-
man Kodak had adopted a policy under which it would only sell
replacement parts to those purchasers of its copiers who would
also agree to have Kodak repair the copiers.20' As a result of this
policy, independent service organizations ("ISOs"), which had
previously repaired Kodak copiers in competition with Kodak, were
forced out of business. There was evidence that the ISOs had
supplied repair services at a lower price than Kodak.20 5 Kodak
moved for summary judgment on the ISOs claim that Kodak had
illegally tied the sale of its replacement parts to its repair services.
In denying Kodak's motion, the Court determined that the after-
market sales of parts and services for Kodak copiers were separate
markets for purposes of the tying analysis. 2 6 Kodak could be
found per se liable at trial if the plaintiffs could prove that Kodak
had used its market power in the parts market to force customers
to purchase repair services from it.207 In a significant footnote,
the Court emphasized its concern for the unjustified restriction of
intrabrand competition.20 ' The Court pointed out that it had not
been unduly concerned about the limitation of intrabrand com-
petition in Sylvania because the parties in that case were in a
vertical relationship. 209 In Eastman Kodak, the concern for intra-
brand competition was greater because "[i]n the relevant market,
service, Kodak and the ISOs are direct competitors; their relation-
ship is horizontal."210 The Court concluded that, by "repeating
the mantra 'interbrand competition,'" Eastman Kodak could not
202 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
203 See, ag., Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); New York v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festi-
val Enters., Inc., 248 Cal. Rptr. 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
204 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
205 Id. at 2077.
206 I. at 2079-80.
207 Id. at 2081.
208 Id. at 2084 n.18.
209 Id. at 2084-85 n.18.
210 Id. at 2084 n.18.
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obviate the adverse effect of its conduct in the intrabrand market
for servicing Kodak copiers.21
1
In Eastman Kodak, the Court thus recognized that the effect
on intrabrand competition can be particularly adverse when hori-
zontal "conduct is involved and, indeed, that the per se rule should
apply when one competitor is able to eliminate its rivals from the
intrabrand market. The rationale of Eastman Kodak suggests that it
should be illegal for one or more distributors to induce a supplier
to terminate a competitor. Such conduct affects intrabrand com-
petition as adversely as Kodak's exclusion of the ISOs from the
copier repair market.
The question remains, however, whether these implications of
Eastman Kodak can be reconciled with Sharp. It is easy to reconcile
Eastman Kodak with Sharp when more than one distributor induces
a supplier to terminate a rival. In Sharp, the Court expressly reaf-
firmed its prior holdings in Klor's, General Motors, and Topco on the
per se illegality of broad horizontal restrictions of intrabrand com-
petition.212 In fact, in the recent case of Lovett v. General Motors
Corp.,213 the court construed Sharp to require that distributor ter-
minations induced by a group of competitors be found per se
illegal as naked restrictions of intrabrand competition.214
211 Id.
212 In fact, the Court used language that supports using a horizontal/vertical dichot-
omy to analyze distributor terminations:
This notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per se illegality and
that of vertical per se illegality was explicitly rejected in GTE Sylvania . . . as it
had to be, since a horizontal agreement to divide territories is per se illegal . . .
while GTE Sylvania held that a vertical agreement to do so is not.
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988) (citations omitted);
see also Liebeler, supra note 36, at 906-08 (stating that the Sharp Court's reaffirmation of
the horizontal/vertical dichotomy represented an unfortunate reversion to a formalistic
standard.)
213 769 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Minn. 1991).
214 Id. at 1517. The Court in Lovett was able to characterize the termination as hori-
zontal under Sharp because it was induced by several distributors. Id. In Big Apple BMW,
Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,918 (3d Cir. Aug. 6,
1992), the United States distributor for BMW automobiles had allegedly denied the
plaintiff's BMW dealership application because of pressure from several other dealers who
would have competed with the plaintiff. Id. at 68,389. The court concluded that, under
Sharp, the dealers' group action should be characterized as a per se illegal horizontal
restraint rather than as a vertical restraint subject to the rule of reason. Id. at 68,401-02.
Similarly, in ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,505 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1176 (1992), several automobile dealers
had requested a group of manufacturers to refuse to franchise several other dealers at a
nearby location. Id. at 66,198-200. In applying the per se rule, the court concluded that
Sharp required that a more stringent standard be applied to horizontal than to vertical
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It is more difficult to reconcile Eastman Kodak with Sharp in
those cases in which only a single distributor convinces a supplier
to terminate a rival. The Sharp Court found Business Electronics'
termination to be vertical because one competitor rather than sev-
eral had issued an ultimatum to Sharp.21 5 Although this pedantic
distinction bears no relationship to economic effect, the Sharp
Court was clear in its requirement that the rule of reason should
apply in single inducement cases.21' The Court, however, did not
specify how the rule of reason analysis should be conducted. The
horizontal/vertical analysis proposed in this Article could qualify as
the type of rule of reason approach mandated by Sharp for single
inducement cases. Applying this approach to all horizontally in-
duced terminations, regardless of the number of instigating distrib-
utors, would create an appropriate synthesis between Sharp and
Eastman Kodak for the analysis of all mixed terminations. Under
such an approach, the type of analysis employed by the courts
would no longer turn on formalistic distinctions between "single"
and "multiple" inducements of a distributor's termination.
In order to adopt this new approach, the courts must aban-
don their traditional view of the per se rule and the rule of rea-
son as entirely divergent forms of antitrust analysis.217 Indeed, it
is more appropriate to view these two forms of analysis as parts of
a continuum rather than as opposing approaches to antitrust anal-
ysis. 218 The objective of both types of analysis is to determine the
likely competitive purpose and effect of the conduct in question.
The rules differ only in the degree of inquiry necessary for the
courts to feel comfortable that they have made such a determina-
tion effectively. The per se rule is simply a short-hand method by
which the courts can assume the anticompetitive purpose and
effect of conduct with which they are familiar.219 The rule of
reason requires a more detailed inquiry into particular conduct for
which the competitive consequences are not as obvious.
'conspiracies. Id. at 66,200-01.
215 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 734.
216 Id. at 726-31.
217 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
218 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Aproaches to
Anitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L REv. 685 (1991).
219 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for
Exdusionamy Rights, 71 MINN. L REV. 1293, 1294-95 n.8 (1987); Marks & Jacobson, supra
note 142, at 211-12.
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The rule of reason itself is not a unitary standard but encom-
passes varying degrees of inquiry. Although courts and commenta-
tors have traditionally believed that the approach requires an in-
quiry into all the relevant circumstances of a particular re-
straint,220 the courts in recent years have begun to apply more
abbreviated versions of the rule of reason in certain circumstances.
These new approaches recognize that often it is not practical, or
desirable, for the fact finder to consider every factor that might
conceivably bear on the competitive effect of the defendant's con-
duct.221 One commentator has even concluded that in some cas-
es the rule of reason can be applied in the "twinkling of an
eye." 222 Thus, when the per se rule is inapplicable, the alterna-
tive need not be a full-blown analysis of the market impact of the
restraint at issue.23
In a few recent cases, the Supreme Court has implicitly adopt-
ed a new intermediate rule of reason standard that focuses on a
defendant's purpose for a restriction rather than on its market
power.224 Eschewing a market analysis, the Court was willing to
220 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
221 It is particularly difficult for the courts to define the relevant product and geo-
graphic markets and the defendant's relative share of those markets. Proving such issues
requires extensive documentary evidence and endless testimony from economists and
other experts. See Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule 54 ANTITRUSr
L.J. 27, 28 (1985). Because the traditional rule of reason puts so many factors at issue, it
is impossible to predict the outcome of cases. Indeed, one commentator recently de-
scribed the traditional rule of reason analysis as "effectively worthless." Bums, supra note
75, at 37-38. Some courts have recently attempted to refine the rule of reason by adopt-
ing a "market power screen" for vertical restraints. Under this approach a vertical restric-
tion cannot be found illegal unless a defendant possesses a market share above a particu-
lar threshold. See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir.
1986); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Muenster
Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1291 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1985), affid, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th
Cir. 1986). The market power screen, however, still requires the courts to consider the
defendant's market share, which is the most difficult factor in the rule of reason test.
One commentator has thus concluded that "a market-share test would offer little help in
determining the competitive effects of vertical restraints." William S. Comanor, Vertical
PrlceFixing, Vertical Market Restrictions and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L REV. 983,
1001 n.81 (1985). The market power screen also disregards the impact of a vertical re-
straint on intrabrand competition. Even if a supplier has only a small share of the
interbrand market, its termination of a distributor as a result of a competitor's induce-
ment unreasonably restricts intrabrand competition.
222 Areeda, supra note 221, at 28.
223 See infra notes 236-49 and accompanying text.
224 See FIC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of




prohibit the restraints at issue simply because they had no valid
competitive purpose. Such an approach is well suited to mixed
terminations, where the supplier's motive for a termination is so
revealing of its competitive effect. 225 In National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,226 an engineering society had pro-
hibited competitive bidding by engineering contractors. In its
opinion, the Court followed neither a traditional per se nor a
standard rule of reason analysis. Instead of finding the ban on
competitive bidding illegal on its face, the Court considered the
defendants' arguments that the ban was necessary for public safe-
ty.227 However, at the same time, the Court completely avoided
an analysis of the defendants' market power, prohibiting the ban
on the simple grounds that it had no valid economic purpose. 228
Similarly, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 229 the Court declined to
apply a per se analysis to the NCAA's television restrictions. The
NCAA had regulated the number of times its member colleges
could appear on television and the amount they could be paid for
such appearances."0 As in Professional Engineers, the Court did
not require an analysis of specificcompetitive effects as an alterna-
tive to the per se rule.231 The Court found the NCAA's restric-
tions to be illegal simply because they were not necessary to pro-
mote the NCAA's valid purpose of regulating amateur collegiate
athletics. 2'2 Finally, in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,233 a
dentists' association argued that it had refused to supply x-rays to
insurance companies in order to enhance the quality of patient
care. The Court refused to take a traditional per se approach to
this group boycott.2 4 However, despite its avoidance of the per
se rule, the Court found the conduct illegal after a rather abbrevi-
ated analysis indicated that there was no valid economic purpose
for the refusal to supply the x-rays.2 s5
225 See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
226 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
227 Id. at 687-96.
228 Id. at 693 ("On its face, this agreement restrains trade within the meaning of § 1
of the Sherman Act.").
229 468 U.S. 85 (1985).
230 Id. at 91-94.
231 Id. at 86 ("[A]bsence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restric-
tion on price or output....") (syllabus).
232 Id. at 104-20.
233 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
234 Id. at 458.
235 Id. at 459-60 ("Application of the Rule of Reason to these facts is not a matter of
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Consistent with the Court's approach in Professional Engineers,
NCAA, and Indiana Federation of Dentists, the alternative to the per
se rule in mixed termination cases need not be a full rule of
reason market analysis. The courts can use an intermediate stan-
dard that considers the supplier's purpose for the termination.
The but for causal analysis proposed in this Article is just such an
intermediate standard. The analysis lies between the traditional
per se rule and a typical rule of reason approach on the continu-
um of antitrust analysis. In contrast to a per se analysis, a supplier
will have an opportunity to prove that it had a valid
procompetitive purpose for a termination. Furthermore, unlike
traditional rule of reason cases, a plaintiff would only have to
show that a supplier had an improper purpose in order to prevail.
Once a plaintiff meets the but for standard, it would not have to
prove that the supplier possessed undue market power or that the
termination unduly injured competition in the interbrand mar-
ket.23
6
There is, in fact, specific Supreme Court authority for apply-
ing such a new rule of reason standard to mixed terminations.
Sylvania is the only Supreme Court case that has indicated how a
rule of reason analysis of nonprice vertical restrictions should be
conducted.3 7 Sharp held that the termination of a distributor at
the instigation of a single competitor was a nonprice vertical re-
straint.3 8 Thus, under Sharp, it is appropriate to apply the
Sylvania balancing test to such a termination.
The Sylvania Court recognized that the reduction of
intrabrand competition caused by vertical restrictions was justified
by the corresponding stimulation of interbrand competition.3 9
Under Sylvania, therefore, the legality of a particular vertical re-
straint is determined by balancing any harm to intrabrand compe-
tition against the benefit to interbrand competition. 240
any great difficulty .... [T]he Commission's failure to engage in detailed market analy-
sis is not fatal to its finding of a violation .... ).
236 Such a showing would be impossible for most terminated distributors. See supra
notes 21, 44, 200 and accompanying text.
237 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
238 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-31 (1987).
239 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55.
240 Id. at 57 n.27. Although Sylvania only referred to the balancing test in a cursory
manner, nearly all courts and commentators have construed Sylvania to require such an
approach. Se, e.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745
(7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980); Rozkowski, supra
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The horizontal/vertical dichotomy fits perfectly with the
Sylvania balancing test. As the Court stated in Sylvania and Sharp,
interbrand competition is more important -than intrabrand compe-
tition.241 Thus, when a supplier independently acts to terminate
a distributor, its natural intent to promote its interbrand competi-
tiveness should be sufficient to outweigh any reduction of
intrabrand competition resulting from the termination. However,
when another distributor induces a termination, there is no bene-
ficial interbrand effect to weigh in the balancing analysis. In such
a case, the restriction of intrabrand competition alone justifies
voiding the termination under a Sylvania balancing approach. 242
Such an analysis is consistent with Eastman Kodak, where the Court
was concerned with efforts by firms to suppress competition from
their intrabrand rivals.
243
Once the horizontal or vertical origin of a termination is
established, a court need not determine the parties' market power.
Vertically imposed terminations should be allowed regardless of
note 83, at 157-58. The Sylvania balancing test has been criticized. One commentator has
stated that it is "utterly incapable of principled judicial application." Rozkowski, supra
note 83, at 158.
241 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 726; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
242 Several courts have held that the restriction of intrabrand competition, in the
absence of a countervailing interbrand benefit, suffices to prove the illegality of a vertical
restraint under the Sylvania balancing test. Se Sharp, 485 U.S. at 749 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Not a word in the Sylvania opinion implied that the elimination of intrabrand
competition could be justified as reasonable without any evidence of a purpose to im-
prove interbrand competition."); Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 405, 412 (6th
Cir. 1982) (stating that "appellants' conduct not only reduced intrabrand competition but
also did not promote interbrand competition"); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am:, 622 F.2d
1068, 1075, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) (indicating that in cases in which no interbrand benefit
is established, an adverse impact on intrabrand competition alone may support a finding
of an antitrust violation); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459
(1986) ("Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue[,] ... an agreement limiting
consumer choice ... cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason."). Some courts and
commentators, however, believe that the mere restriction of intrabrand competition is not
sufficient to prove the illegality of a vertical restraint and that, in addition, the plaintiff
must prove an adverse effect on interbrand competition. See Murphy v. Business Cards
Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he effect on intrabrand com-
petition ' is not relevant if there is intense interbrand competition.'") (quoting the
lower court); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802 (6th Cir.
1988) (adverse effect on intrabrand competition resulting from termination of several
dealers insufficient to support illegality); Tunis Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d
715 (3d Cir. 1991) (termination of dealer not illegal because interbrand competition
unaffected); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986)
(same); Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc., v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.
1981) (same).
243 See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the manufacturer's size, while horizontally motivated terminations
should be illegal even when they are induced by small distributors.
A termination effected independently by a supplier is no less ancil-
lary to a procompetitive purpose simply because the supplier hap-
pens to have a large market share. Large manufacturers should be
just as motivated as smaller ones to ensure that their distribution
systems deliver products to consumers in the most efficient man-
ner.2' Furthermore, an induced termination is no less restrictive
of intrabrand competition when the supplier has a small share of
the interbrand market or the terminated dealer has a small busi-
ness. In fact, the smaller dealer is more likely to be on the receiv-
ing end of a termination induced by a larger competitor. The
harm to intrabrand competition is particularly significant in such a
case because the small entrepreneur is often the most innovative
deliverer of services to consumers and the greatest impetus to the
efficiency of competing dealers.
245
The courts have defined market power as "the power to con-
trol prices or exclude competition."246 When the but for test is
met, a dealer clearly has exercised the power to exclude a compet-
itor from the relevant market. Thus, no further proof of the
defendant's market power should be necessary. 247  When a
244 The Sylvania Court relied on the fact that the presence of interbrand competition
would act as a natural check on manufacturers' limitation of intrabrand competition.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56. It could be argued that monopolists who face no interbrand
competition would not be restrained in limiting the adverse competitive effects of distrib-
utor terminations and, therefore, that terminations independently effected by monopolists
should not always be upheld. There is some precedent for finding vertical restrictions
illegal when they are imposed by manufacturers with market shares in excess of 70%. See
Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983). As some
commentators have pointed out, however, even monopolists want to produce a product
mix at a resale level that is attractive to consumers and thus would be no less interested
than nonmonopolists in ensuring the efficiency of vertical restrictions. See also Wesley J.
Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26 n.78 (1982);
Panel Discussion, Counseling Your Client on Horizontal and Vertical Restraints, 55 ANTITRUST
L.J. 293, 307 (1986) (comments of Donald F. Turner, member of the District of Colum-
bia Bar).
245 As one commentator has stated: "[G]iven that boycotts historically have been the
favored weapon of retailers in suppressing the competition provided by more efficient
discounters, any use of the tactic against discounters should be condemned under the an-
titrust laws as a prophylactic measure." Gerla, supra note 44, at 11. Also, as the Supreme
Court stated in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1958), such a
termination "is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose
business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy. Monopoly
can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it
can by driving them out in large groups." Id. at 213 (footnote omitted).
246 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
247 In Eastman Kodak, the Supreme Court was willing to infer Kodak's power in the
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defendant's conduct has such a clear anticompetitive effect and is
so devoid of any redeeming competitive virtue, there is nothing to
gain-and much to lose-by requiring a plaintiff to meet the
difficult burdens of a market power inquiry. 48
Dispensing with a market power analysis would simplify mixed
termination cases considerably and provide clearer guidance on
what conduct is acceptable. Regardless of their size, manufacturers
would feel free to proceed with terminations designed to make
themselves more effective competitors in the interbrand market. At
the same time, suppliers and dealers would know that all induced
terminations would be deemed illegal on their face. Under such a
clear standard, distributors would be deterred from attempting to
induce a competitor's termination. Manufacturers could readily
resist such inducement by informing the complaining dealer that
both parties would risk liability under the Sherman Act if the
manufacturer proceeded with the termination. 2
49
VIII. CONCLUSION
Mixed termination cases can be analyzed in a way that effec-
tively reveals whether their substantive competitive effect is hori-
zontal or vertical. In contrast to the extreme approaches recently
taken by Congress and many federal courts, a horizontal/vertical
dichotomy fairly balances the interests of suppliers and terminated
distributors. This approach avoids both the harshness of the per se
rule and the weakness of the traditional rule of reason. By sepa-
rating the issue of the cause of a termination from the issue of
conspiracy, the courts can focus on the parties' purpose for a
mixed termination. This new intermediate standard is consistent
with Sylvania's requirement that antitrust rules be based on de-
monstrable economic effect and with Shaip's disavowal of a tradi-
photocopier parts market from its ability to drive independent service organizations out
of business. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2080-81
(1992). As the Court stated, "It is clearly reasonable to infer that Kodak has market
power to raise prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets, since respondents
offer direct evidence that Kodak did so." Id. at 2088.
248 As Professor Areeda has stated, "Once we decide that a class of practice is in the
vast generality of cases detrimental and unjustified, why bother with the complicated and
expensive inquiry into power?" Areeda, supra note 21, at 28.
249 The deterrent effect of the analysis proposed in this Article would be similar to
the approach adopted by Congress in the Robinson-Patman Act, under which it is illegal
not only for a supplier to engage in price discrimination but also for a buyer to know-
ingly induce the grant of a discriminatory discount. S&e 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1988).
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tional per se analysis for terminations induced by a single distribu-
tor. The new standard is also in accordance with the Supreme
Court's recent recognition in Eastman Kodak of the need to pre-
vent the unjustified exclusion of competitors from intrabrand
markets. The federal courts are thus free to adopt the approach
under current Supreme Court standards. By doing so, they may
convince Congress to abstain from ill-conceived legislation to alter
the judicial approach to mixed terminations.
